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CONTRIVED THREATS v. UNCONTRIVED WARNINGS: A GENERAL 
SOLUTION TO THE PUZZLES OF CONTRACTUAL DURESS, 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS, AND BLACKMAIL 
 
Einer Elhauge* 
83 U. CHICAGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
April 3, 2015 
Contractual duress, unconstitutional conditions, and blackmail have long been 
puzzling.  The puzzle is why these doctrines sometimes condemn threatening lawful 
action to induce agreements, but sometimes do not.  This article provides a general 
solution to this puzzle.  Such threats are unlawfully coercive only when they are 
contrived, meaning the threatened action would not have occurred if no threat 
could be made.  I show that such contrived threats can be credible because making 
the threat strongly influences whether the threatened action occurs.  When such 
threats are uncontrived warnings, meaning the threatened action would have 
occurred even if no threat could be made, they are not coercive and can only 
benefit the agreeing parties.  However, sometimes (as with blackmail) agreements 
produced by uncontrived warnings are also unlawful on the different grounds that 
they harm third parties.  The contrived-threat test explains why the Medicaid 
defunding threat in Obamacare was unconstitutional and why (in the pending 
Supreme Court case) interpreting Obamacare as threatening to withhold tax 
credits from States that do not create insurance exchanges should either be 
rejected under the canon of avoidance or result in constitutional invalidation of 
that threat. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Obamacare with one notable 
exception: it struck down the provision that threatened to remove pre-existing 
federal Medicaid funding from states that refused to accept an expansion of 
Medicaid on the grounds that it “‘‘crossed the line distinguishing encouragement 
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from coercion.’’’1  This constitutional standard has been condemned as amorphous 
and meaningless.2  Because the standard explicitly incorporates contract law 
concepts,3 we might hope to find clear guidance in the underlying contract law.  
But contract law makes the legality of threats that induce contractual agreements 
turn on whether the threats are “improper” or in “bad faith”, conclusory labels that 
themselves have been deemed incoherent and meaningless.4  Nor could the Court 
find useful guidance from the general unconstitutional conditions doctrine because 
it has been deemed conclusory, incoherent, and “infamously inadequate.”5  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court seems to have given up even trying to define a coherent 
doctrine, openly admitting both in the Medicaid defunding threat case and a 
subsequent unconstitutional conditions case that it could not articulate the line 
dividing constitutional conditions from unconstitutional ones, but that it was 
nonetheless—somehow—confident that the conditions it was considering were 
over the line.6  This Article offers a coherent theory for solving these doctrinal 
puzzles that is normatively attractive and fits current legal results. 
For analytical clarity, it is important to exclude some cases that lie outside these 
puzzles.  If a threatened action by a government or private party were 
independently unconstitutional or illegal, there is no difficulty condemning it.  
Likewise, sometimes even an uncoerced agreement to a condition or contract 
would be independently unconstitutional or illegal, usually because it harms third 
parties or violates equal protection norms.  In these cases, the independent doctrine 
of unconstitutionality or illegality is doing all the work.  
Other times, whether the agreement was coerced is irrelevant because the 
threatener has a power to compel without any agreement, such as when the 
government has a power to order the relevant action because the individual or State 
has no constitutional right against such compulsion.  Whenever direct coercion is 
permissible, that moots the issue of when threats of otherwise lawful action should 
be deemed coercive because they would be permissible either way.  But in these 
                                           
1 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603, 2606 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., joined 
by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) [hereinafter NFIB]); id. at 2661-62 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, 
JJ.). 
2 Id. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Sotomayor, J.); Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: 
Medicaid and Coercion in the Healthcare Case, 93 B.U.L. REV. 1, 88 (2013). 
3 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (Roberts opinion); id. at 2659-60 (joint opinion). 
4 Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L REV. 717, 752-53, 779 (2005); Robert Hillman, 
Policing Contract Modification Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. 
REV. 849, 862, 875-878 (1979). 
5 Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1351 (2002); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional, Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1419-1420, 1428-29 (1989). 
6 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606-07 (Roberts opinion); id. at 2662 (joint opinion); Agency for International Development 
(AID) v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (2013). 
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cases the work is done by the independent legal doctrines that create a power to 
coerce. 
The cases of interest involve situations where a threat to engage in otherwise 
lawful action (like terminating funding) induces an agreement that is otherwise 
lawful, but the threat is nonetheless deemed too coercive to enforce the induced 
agreement.  Those threats are the ones for which we could use some coherent 
principle to explain why they are sometimes being condemned and sometimes 
being allowed. 
This article provides a simple principle for resolving this puzzle.  It begins, in Part 
II, by resolving the underlying confusion in contract law about duress and contract 
modifications.  This confusion can, I submit, be resolved with the following simple 
principle.  A threat to engage in otherwise lawful action that induces contract 
modification is unlawfully coercive only when the threat is contrived, meaning the 
threatened action would not have occurred if no threat could be made. 
The essence of the normative justification can easily be summarized.  When a 
threat is not contrived, any legal prohibition that prevented the party from 
communicating the threat would, by definition, result in the threatened action.  
Moreover, because the threat, if made, would have induced the contract 
modification, both sides must, by definition, have thought that they were better off 
with the contract modification than with the threatened action.  Deterring such 
threats would harm both parties.  In such cases, communicating the planned action 
is less a threat than an uncontrived warning of what is coming, which gives the 
parties an opportunity to agree on an alternative that makes them both better off. 
In contrast, when the threat is contrived, preventing the threat would not result in 
the threatened action and the parties would stick to the initial contract.   Preventing 
such a contrived threat would clearly leave the threat recipient better off because 
she prefers the pre-existing contract.  Ex post, preventing the contrived threat 
would leave the threatener worse off because he prefers the modification that the 
threat could have induced.  But if the modification raises total value for both 
parties, a threat is unnecessary to achieve that modification because it could be 
achieved with a bonus that shares the joint gain.  If, in contrast, the modification 
would reduce total value, then the prospect of such welfare-reducing threats would 
(if they were allowed) be priced into the contract and reduce reliance on the 
contract in a way that harms both parties.  Moreover, sometimes contrived threats 
will not succeed in inducing contract modification and then be carried out, which 
leaves both parties worse off than if the pre-existing contract had continued.  An 
ability to make such threats might also result in the other side making welfare-
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reducing threats of its own.  Thus, ex ante both parties would be better off 
preventing contrived threats. 
The distinction between contrived threats and uncontrived warnings turns only on 
whether, in a no-threat world, the threatened action would have occurred.    It does 
not turn on the wording of the communication.  Nor does it require inquiry into the 
threatener’s purpose.  The threatener may have the benign purpose of making 
recipients of the threat better off, but the issue here presumes that recipients of 
threats begin with a legal autonomy right to make their own choices free of 
coercion by others, however well-intended that coercion may be.  A threatening 
government may not even have a collective purpose, but that is unnecessary 
because what matters is what the government would have actually done without 
the threat.  To be sure, the lack of any reason to take the threatened action in a no-
threat world provides powerful evidence that the threatened action would not have 
occurred in that world.  In that sense, purpose may sometimes be relevant to 
determining what would have happened, but the ultimate test is solely what would 
have happened without the threat, which need not require inquiry into purpose. 
The contrived nature of a threat should also be distinguished from the credibility of 
that threat.  A threat is credible if, post threat, the threatener would carry out the 
threatened action if the threat recipient does not agree.  A threat is uncontrived if, 
in a no-threat world, the threatener would have taken that action anyway.  The two 
differ because making a threat can strongly influence whether the threatened action 
occurs.  As detailed below, a contrived threat to engage in unprofitable action can 
be credible when done in stages, as in the usual contracts case where performance 
is withheld day by day, because the victim’s refusal to modify at each stage is itself 
not credible, so that the threat is expected to result in profitable modification.  
Making a contrived threat can also change the emotional calculus or create 
reputational effects that make persons carry out the threat even though they would 
not have taken the action in a no-threat world.  Indeed, a credibility test has 
circularity problems where such reputational effects exist because whether a threat 
is credible can depend on whether the induced agreement is enforceable.  Persons 
or governments may also make efforts to make their contrived threats more 
credible, such as incurring commitments, debts, or costs that make carrying out the 
threatened action more likely.  When those efforts would not have been made 
absent an ability to communicate the threat, the credible threat remains contrived.   
A contrived threat is thus not the same as a bluff because contrived threats are 
often credible.  Nor are contrived threats harmless when they are bluffs.  Bluffs can 
be very effective in coercing agreements when the victim is mistaken or even just 
unsure about the credibility of the threat.  Indeed, if the bluff induced the victim to 
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accept an adverse modification, it must have been credible enough to the victim.  
Nor is harm avoided when the victim rejects modification.  If a victim does so 
because he wrongly perceived the threat was not credible, the threat will be carried 
out, harming both parties.  If a victim does so because she correctly perceived the 
threat was not credible, the threat will not be carried out but will still lead to 
unnecessary conflict and negotiation costs.  It is thus always better to deter a 
contrived threat from being made (by eliminating any possible gain from it), 
regardless of how credible the threat might have been or seemed. 
My distinction between contrived threats and uncontrived warnings is related to, 
but differs from, distinctions between threats and warnings that have been drawn 
by Robert Nozick, Thomas Schelling, and others.7  Whereas my definition turns on 
a pure but-for prediction, Nozick and other philosophers define threats in a way 
that combines moral and prediction baselines, which I show below not only 
muddles the results but perversely leads to more immoral conduct.  Schelling and 
others use a prediction baseline, but a different one that is based on a pre-threat 
baseline rather than my no-threat baseline, and Schelling draws no normative 
conclusions about threats but rather focuses on analyzing their credibility.  
Legally, an important benefit of using a contrived-threat test is that, as Part II 
shows, it explains many features and conclusions of contract law, whereas scholars 
who advocate a credibility test acknowledge that their test bears no relationship to 
existing contract law.  Under contract law, modifications without mutual 
consideration are unenforceable if induced by a contrived threat, and modifications 
with mutual consideration are unenforceable if induced by a contrived threat to 
take action that would leave the victim significantly worse off. 
I then show, in Part III, that the contrived-threat test also explains the Medicaid 
defunding case and provides a general solution to the problem of unconstitutional 
conditions.  When a threat is contrived, the government benefit would have been 
provided in the but-for world without that condition, and thus the threat to 
withhold the benefit penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right.  When the 
threat is uncontrived, the government benefit would not have been provided in that 
but-for world, and thus withholding the benefit imposes no penalty.  Some 
constitutional law scholarship going back to Seth Kreimer has, following Nozick, 
included a similar prediction baseline but (like Nozick) combined it with other 
baselines in a way that I show confuse and worsen the results.  My contrived-threat 
test also shows that (in the pending Supreme Court case) Obamacare should not be 
interpreted to deny federal tax credits to States that declined to create health 
                                           
7 See infra at __. 
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insurance exchanges because that would be a contrived threat and thus 
unconstitutional. 
Finally, Part IV shows that the contrived-threat test also explains legal treatment of 
threats that induce private parties to enter into new contracts.  It also solves the 
blackmail puzzle, showing that all blackmail contracts are necessarily produced by 
either (1) contrived threats, which creates inefficiency for the contracting parties 
without affecting information disclosure or (2) uncontrived warnings, which 
suppresses the disclosure of information to third parties whose interests often 
trump the interests of the contracting parties.  The combination is what explains the 
full scope of blackmail law. 
 
II. THREATS THAT INDUCE CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS 
A. Why Contract Standards Suggest a Contrived-Threat Test 
For threats of otherwise lawful action that induce contract modifications, contract 
law has both a special rule and a more general rule.  The special rule applies only 
to modifications without mutual consideration, which increase the obligations of 
one party without providing any fresh consideration for that change.  The more 
general duress rule applies to any threat that induces contractual agreement.  
Although the general legal standards for both are conclusory, the official guidance 
on them suggests a contrived-threat test. 
1. The Special Rule for Modifications Without Mutual Consideration.  A threat 
to breach a contract that induces a modification without mutual consideration is not 
binding unless the modification is (for a goods contract) in “good faith” or (for a 
non-goods contract) “fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by 
the parties when the contract was made.”8  Although terms like “good faith” and 
“fair and equitable” are conclusory, the law does provide guidance on the meaning 
of these terms. 
For non-goods contracts, this guidance provides: “The limitation to a modification 
which is ‘fair and equitable’ ... requires an objectively demonstrable reason for 
seeking a modification.”9  An objectively demonstrable reason provides an 
independent reason to breach if no modification were possible, thus suggesting an 
                                           
8 U.C.C §2-209 Comment 2 (1998); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §73, 89 (1981). 
9 Id. §89 Comment b. 
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uncontrived warning.  The lack of any such reason would instead suggest a likely 
contrived threat. 
The unanticipated circumstances element is often confused with unforeseen 
circumstances, but that is not the test because the Restatement makes clear that 
such circumstances could be established by such foreseeable events as a person 
being offered a higher price or incurring a 17% cost increase.10  This is consistent 
with a contrived-threat test because such changes, though foreseeable, can often be 
the basis for an uncontrived warning if they make breach profitable despite 
contract remedies.  The Restatement indicates that what it means by an 
unanticipated circumstance is one that “was not adequately covered” by the 
contract “even though it was foreseen as a remote possibility.”11 
“Unanticipated” thus means unaddressed by the contract.  This factor is quite 
relevant to judging whether a threat is contrived because if any changed 
circumstances were already specifically addressed in the contract, then it seems 
unlikely that the change would have provoked a breach in a world where no 
modification were possible.  For example, suppose costs have increased by 17%, 
but the contract specifically provides that if costs increase above 10%, the contract 
price will increase by the cost increase plus a specified markup.  In that case, the 
parties have already determined what suffices to induce performance under those 
circumstances, so a claim that those circumstances would inevitably provoke 
breach seems contrived.  Threatening to breach because of a circumstance 
specifically anticipated by the contract thus seems likely to be a contrived threat. 
For goods contracts, the UCC comments flesh out the “good faith” test by stating:  
the extortion of a “modification” without legitimate commercial reason is 
ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith….  The test of “good 
faith” ... may in some situations require an objectively demonstrable reason 
for seeking a modification.  But such matters as a market shift which makes 
performance come to involve a loss may provide such a reason even though 
there is no such unforeseen difficulty as would make out a legal excuse from 
performance…12 
The reference to an “objectively demonstrable reason” again suggests an 
uncontrived warning, and the last sentence confirms that such a reason can exist 
even because of foreseen changes in circumstances. 
                                           
10 Id. §89 Illustrations 3-4. 
11 Id. §89 Comment b. 
12 U.C.C §2-209 Comment 2. 
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2. The General Duress Rule.  The general duress rule provides that any contract 
(including a new contract or modification with mutual consideration) is voidable 
when induced by (1) “an improper threat” that (2) “leaves the victim no reasonable 
alternative” but to agree.13  
At one time, the no-reasonable-alternative element referred to conclusory, and 
somewhat mystical, notions of whether the victim’s “free will” was overborne.  
However, contract law has long rejected such notions and concluded that this 
element simply requires evidence that carrying out the threat would have made the 
victim significantly worse off.14   
The key normative work is thus done by the improperness element, which standing 
alone is conclusory.  But Restatement § 176 provides an extended definition of 
when a threat is improper.  Some of the definition simply refers to threated actions 
that are independently unlawful, which does not help with the current issue.15  But 
other parts of the definition say a threat is improper if it is in bad faith and lacks an 
objectively demonstrable reason, which the above shows suggests a contrived 
threat.16  Even more helpfully, the Restatement provides that: “A threat is improper 
if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and ... the threatened act would harm 
the recipient and would not significantly benefit the party making the threat.”17  If 
a threatened act would not significantly benefit the threatener, the party likely 
would not have taken the action if unable to make the threat, thus indicating a 
contrived threat. 
B. How a Contrived-Threat Test Explains the Caselaw 
1. Cases of Modifications Without Mutual Consideration.  Consider first the 
renown case, Alaska Packers’s Ass’n v. Dominico.18  A group of fishermen agreed 
in San Francisco to take a boat to Alaska and fish in exchange for a company 
paying them $50 for the season plus two cents for each salmon they caught.  Once 
the fishermen were in Alaska, they threatened to stop work entirely and return to 
San Francisco unless their fixed pay was increased to $100.  Although the 
fishermen claimed they did so because their nets were defective, the court found 
                                           
13 Restatement §175. 
14 Id. §175, Comment b (rejecting test of whether “the threat must arouse such fear as precludes a party from 
exercising free will and judgment or that it must be such as would induce assent on the part of a brave man or a man 
of ordinary firmness . . . because of its vagueness and impracticability” and providing a series of examples that make 
clear that no reasonable alternative exists whenever the alternative would make the victim significantly worse off). 
15 Id. §176(1)(a)-(c). 
16 Id. §176(1)(d) &  Comment e. 
17 Id. §176(2). 
18 117 F. 99, 100 (9th Cir. 1902). 
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the nets were not actually defective and that the threat to stop work was “without 
any valid cause” and timed to take advantage of the fact that the company could 
not get replacement fishermen to such a remote location in time for the short 
fishing season.19  The company, which had also invested $150,000 in a salmon 
cannery in Alaska, agreed to increase the fixed pay to $100.  The court held that, 
under these circumstances, this modification was unenforceable.20 
Given these findings,21 the fishermen’s threat was clearly contrived.  The 
fishermen had no valid reason for threatening to stop work, and doing so would not 
only deprive them of any wages for the season, but also require them to fund their 
travel back to San Francisco and subject themselves to a risk of damages.  There 
was thus no good reason to think that, if unable to make this threat, the fishermen 
would have stopped working.  Thus, if contract law deters such threats from being 
made (by eliminating any gains from the modifications they induce), then the 
fishermen would have performed under the existing contract. 
The lower court had upheld the modification because it concluded that the 
company’s agreement to it meant the company must have concluded the 
modification was better than suing for breach of contract, probably because the 
fishermen could not pay damages, and thus the modification was mutually 
beneficial.22  The problem with that lower court logic is that it wrongly assumes 
that, absent any communicated threat, the fishermen would have walked off the 
job.  Instead, the findings indicate that they would not have done so, and that their 
threat to do so was thus contrived to extort the modification.  A contract doctrine 
that deters such contrived threats from ever being communicated will thus result in 
performance of the original contract.  A contract doctrine that instead made 
modifications produced by contrived threats enforceable would encourage such 
contrived threats, and thus clearly make the company worse off because it prefers 
original-contract performance to the modification. 
                                           
19 Id. at 102.  See also id. (stressing that the fishermen “willfully and arbitrarily broke” their contractual obligation 
and noting parallel to another case where the threat to breach was “unjustifiable”). 
20 Although some read this case to adopt a flat rule that modifications without mutual consideration are never 
enforceable, the court stressed that its holding that mutual consideration was absent applied only “under such 
circumstances” and depended on the conclusion that any mutual waiver of the original contract was not “voluntary” 
because the circumstances were like another case where the threatener “takes an unjustifiable advantage of the 
necessities of the other party” by threatening nonperformance and thus “coerces” the other party to increase the 
consideration it provides.  Id.  
21 Some have argued that the true facts were otherwise, see Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, supra note , 
at 757, but what matters for assessing the legal standard is the conclusion that the found facts made the modification 
unenforceable. 
22 117 F. at 102. 
10 
Moreover, a contract doctrine that made modifications produced by contrived 
threats enforceable would also be bad for fishermen ex ante.  Switching to such a 
doctrine would encourage contrived threats and modifications that would make the 
fishermen’s original promise to perform less valuable to the fish company, and 
thus make the fishing company unwilling to pay as much or to enter into the 
contract at all.  To make itself less vulnerable to such contrived threats, the 
company might also be less willing to make investments in reliance on the contract 
(like $150,000 for a cannery or chartering a boat), which is ex ante bad for the 
fishermen because reducing those investments reduce the productive value of their 
labor and thus what they can get paid. 
In contrast, suppose the facts had been different.  Suppose the fishermen threatened 
to stop work unless their pay was increased to $100 because once they got to 
Alaska, another firm offered to pay them $90.  This would not be a contrived threat 
because, if unable to make this threat, the fishermen would walk off the job for 
better pay, which clearly leaves the fish company worse off than with the 
modification.  It would instead be an uncontrived warning of what would 
inevitably happen if no modification were possible.  Deterring the modification 
induced by this uncontrived warning would be harmful to both sides because 
without it the fishermen would get $90 instead of $100, and the fish company 
would be without fishermen. 
But doesn’t this uncontrived warning still diminish the willingness of the fish 
company to pay as much in the original contract or to make investments that rely 
on it?  Actually, no.  The uncontrived warning allows a modification that makes 
the fish company better off than it would be if fishermen walked off the job, which 
is what would happen if no warning were given.  Thus, the possibility that 
uncontrived warnings would produce such modifications actually increases the 
value of the contract and encourages greater investment relying on it.  To be sure, 
the prospect that the fishermen might independently want to walk off the job (in a 
way that a contract damages action would not fully compensate) does diminish the 
value of the contract and reliance on it.  But if the warning is uncontrived, that 
prospect was going to arise regardless; the ability to modify the contract when it 
arises thus can only reduce the losses from that prospect. 
Consistent with this conclusion, the Restatement indicates that a modification 
increasing an employee’s pay for already-contracted performance would be 
binding if it came after an employee told his employer that he was abandoning the 
11 
contract because another firm had offered him more money.23  The Alaska Packers 
court’s own reasoning likewise suggests that its result would have been different if 
the threat to breach the contract were made for a “valid cause,” which switching to 
a higher-paying firm would presumably supply.  Indeed, Alaska Packers indicated 
no doubts about the enforceability of a prior modification without mutual 
consideration that increased the fixed pay of many of the fishermen from $50 to 
$60 before they left San Francisco.24  The fishermen would not have been able to 
induce that change if the fish company could secure substitute fishermen for less 
than $60, which suggests the market rate had risen to $60 for these fishermen, and 
that they would thus have declined to get on the boat for Alaska if no modification 
were possible. 
Likewise, if a party’s contract-performance costs have increased above expected 
costs sufficiently to make performance unprofitable, then modifications that pay it 
more for the same performance have generally been deemed binding.25  In such 
cases, threats not to perform are usually uncontrived warnings because the party 
would likely walk away from the unprofitable contract if unable to communicate 
any threat to do so.  This is not always so because paying contract damages might 
be even more unprofitable than performance, but the cases finding the 
modifications enforceable generally indicate that the threatener was unwilling to 
perform at the contract price, perhaps because the threatener rationally found the 
performance cost worse than the risk of paying contract damages,26 which would 
make the threat uncontrived. 
2. Cases of Modifications With Mutual Consideration.  Consider now the famous 
case of Wolf v. Marlton Corp.27  After contracting to buy a house in a housing 
development, the buyers decided to divorce and wanted to escape the contract.  
They threatened that, unless the seller agreed to cancel the contract and return their 
security deposit, they would go ahead with the purchase and deliberately resell the 
house to an undesirable purchaser, which would reduce property values in the 
neighboring tracts owned by the seller.  The court held that this threat of economic 
harm overcame the free will of the seller, but also held that was insufficient to 
                                           
23 Restatement §89, Illustration 3; Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196 (1921).  Although a threat to 
leave for higher pay could be contrived if the pay increase were lower than expected contract damages, the 
employee had simply announced he was leaving for higher pay without demanding any modification, thus indicating 
that he would have left if no modification were possible.  Id. at 199. 
24 117 F. at 100. 
25 Restatement §89, Illustrations 1-2, 4. 
26 Restatement §89 Illustration 1; Siebring Mfg. Co. v. Carlson Hybrid Corn Co., 246 Iowa 923, 926-927 (1955); 
Brian Construction v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72, 74 (Conn. 1978); Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 490 (1882); Munroe 
v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 305, 307 (Mass. 1830). 
27 57 N.J. Super. 278 (1959). 
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constitute duress unless the threat was also “wrongful.”28  The court acknowledged 
that the threatened action was perfectly lawful because the buyers had the legal 
right to resell to whomever they wished, regardless of the economic effect on the 
seller.29  However, the court concluded it was nonetheless wrongful when “a party 
for purely malicious and unconscionable motives threatens to resell such a home to 
a purchaser, specially selected because he would be undesirable, for the sole 
purpose of injuring the builder’s business.”30  The Restatement likewise makes 
clear that a threat to resell property to a purchaser that will have adverse effects on 
surrounding land is improper only if the threat is made “solely” to induce the 
contract modification.31 
The court’s conclusion fits well with the theory that threats are wrongful when they 
are contrived.  If the threat to resell to a purchaser specially selected to be 
undesirable was “purely malicious” and with the “sole purpose” of harming the 
seller’s business and inducing a modification, then there was no good reason to 
think that (if unable to communicate the threat) the buyers would have limited their 
resale options to undesirable purchasers.  Limiting the set of potential purchasers 
would naturally tend to lower the expected resale price and thus harm the 
threatening buyers.  Deterring the threat would thus result in the original buyers 
making no special effort to seek out undesirable purchasers.  The threat was thus 
contrived and, accordingly, wrongful. 
The court’s reasoning indicates its holding would have been different if the threat 
were not made for the sole purpose of harming the seller, but was actually warning 
about coming action that would be independently beneficial for the threatening 
buyers.  Suppose, for example, the buyers had told the seller they planned to resell 
to a registered child molester because he was willing to pay 10% over market 
price.  Then the communication would be an uncontrived warning because, if 
unable to make this communication and negotiate a modification, the buyers would 
in fact resell to the child molester who was willing to pay the most.  The seller 
would prefer to receive this warning because it enables the seller to negotiate a 
modification that makes the seller better off than it would be without the warning. 
Another leading case is Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp.32  Austin had a 
contract to supply gear parts to Loral to make radar sets for the Navy.  When Loral 
got a second Navy contract for radar sets, Loral told Austin it would get a second 
                                           
28 Id. at 286. 
29 Id. at 287-288. 
30 Id. at 288.   
31 Restatement §176, Illustration 10. 
32 Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124 (1971). 
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contract only on those gear parts for which it was lowest bidder.  Austin 
immediately said it was opposed to supplying less than all gear parts on the second 
contract, and the next day Austin threatened to cease deliveries under the first 
contract unless Loral not only ordered all gear parts from Austin on the second 
contract but also gave Austin substantial price increases on gear parts under the 
first contract, whether or not those gear parts were already delivered.33  Although 
the court focused on whether Loral had any reasonable alternative because that was 
the issue disputed on appeal, the court made clear that duress also required a 
showing that the threat was “wrongful.”34 
Here the threat was properly deemed wrongful because the threat to cease delivery 
was contrived.35  True, the lower court noted that Austin “claimed” it was 
motivated by cost increases that made supplying gear parts unprofitable,36 but the 
high court’s statement of facts omitted this claim in a way that implicitly rejected 
it.  Further, such a cost-based motive seemed implausible given the facts that: (1) 
the timing indicated the threat was motivated by a desire to supply all gear parts on 
the second contract, rather than by cost increases; (2) cost increases that make 
supplying gear parts unprofitable is not a likely motive to insist on supplying more 
gear parts; and (3) a need to cover costs on future supplies cannot explain the 
demand for price increases on already-delivered gear parts.  Thus, the facts 
suggested that Austin would not have naturally ceased delivery under the first 
contract, but threatened to do so only because making that threat would induce the 
desired contract modification. 
When cost increases do make contract performance highly unprofitable, the 
Restatement concludes it is proper to threaten to breach unless the price is 
increased.37  This is consistent with a contrived-threat test because such facts 
suggest the party would not perform even if there were no prospect of inducing a 
modification, so that the threat was an uncontrived warning. 
                                           
33 Id. at 129. 
34 Id. at 131.   
35 Dicta in the opinion suggests that any threat to breach a contract is wrongful, 29 N.Y.2d at 130-131, but the actual 
holding is limited to the court’s factual findings, and the Restatement makes it crystal clear that “A threat by a party 
to a contract not to perform his contractual duty is not, of itself, improper.”  Restatement §176 Comment e.  
36 Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 316 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).  The lower court did not 
confirm whether Austin’s costs had actually risen enough to make performance unprofitable, but simply noted that 
cost increases and renegotiations were common at the time.  Id. 
37 Restatement §176, Illustration 8. 
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C. A General Proof for the Contrived-Threat Test 
Call the value of a contract Ct for the threatener and Cr for the recipient of the 
threat.  Call the value of a contract modification Mt for the threatener and Mr for 
the recipient.  And call the value of the situation if the threatened action were taken 
Tt for the threatener and Tr for recipient.   
We know Mr > Tr or else the recipient would not have agreed to the modification.  
For modifications without mutual consideration, by definition Cr > Mr because the 
modification worsens the deal for the recipient with zero offsetting benefit.  
Therefore, Cr > Mr > Tr.  For modifications with mutual consideration, it may not 
be clear that Cr > Mr at the time of modification.38  But establishing the no-
reasonable-alternative element of duress establishes that Cr > Tr.  Such a threat 
would be unnecessary unless the recipient preferred the contract to the 
modification (if Mr > Cr, the recipient would accept the offered modification 
without any threat), so we can infer from such a threat that Cr > Mr.  Alternatively, 
direct proof might exist that Cr > Mr, in which case we also know that Cr > Tr 
because Mr > Tr.  Either way, contract doctrine elements other than the 
“improperness” or “bad faith” of the threat establish that Cr > Mr > Tr. 
We know the threatener prefers the modification both to the contract and to the 
threatened action, or else the threatener would not have sought and agreed to the 
modification, so Mt > Ct and Mt > Tt.  However, further ranking has two 
possibilities that differ depending on whether the threatener prefers the contract to 
taking the threatened action.  One possibility is that Mt > Ct > Tt.  In this case, 
taking the threatened action leaves the threatener worse off than it would be under 
the contract.  The other possibility is that Mt > Tt > Ct.   In this case, taking the 
threatened action would make the threatener better off than it would be under the 
contract. 
1. Uncontrived Warnings.  If Mt > Tt > Ct and the law prevents the threat and thus 
the modification, then the threatened action will occur because it makes the 
threatener better off than sticking to the contract.  Preventing the threat and 
modification would thus make both parties worse off because they would both 
prefer the modification to the situation with the threatened action (that is, Mr > Tr 
and Mt > Tt).  The threat is thus an uncontrived warning of what is inevitably 
coming unless the parties agree to a mutually beneficial alternative. 
                                           
38 Because the threat recipient opposes modification enforcement, Cr > Mr at the time of litigation, but that could 
reflect changes in costs or market prices since the time of modification. 
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True, such an uncontrived threat will induce a modification that is less valuable to 
the recipient than the contract.  Thus, relative to contract performance, the prospect 
of modifications might seem to reduce the contract’s initial value to the recipient.  
But contract performance is the wrong baseline because without the uncontrived 
threat and modification, the victim would instead suffer the threatened action, the 
prospect of which would reduce the contract’s initial value to the recipient even 
more.  Accordingly, relative to the correct but-for baseline of the threatened action 
occurring, the prospect of allowing modifications when uncontrived warnings are 
made will raise the contract’s initial value to the threat recipient, making the 
recipient willing to give contract terms more favorable to the threatener and to 
make more relationship-specific investments, both of which will also raise the 
contract’s initial value to the threatener.  Both parties are thus better off if such 
uncontrived warnings are allowed to induce contract modifications. 
2. Contrived Threats.  If Mt > Ct > Tt, then if the law prevents the threat and 
modification, the threatened action would not occur because taking the threatened 
action would leave the threatener worse off than under the contract.   The original 
contract will thus be performed.  Preventing such a contrived threat would thus 
clearly leave the recipient better off because Cr > Mr.  That may suffice if the 
normative goal of duress/modification doctrine is simply to protect the recipient. 
Further, ex ante, preventing contrived threats will also be preferable to the 
threatener, and thus both parties would benefit from a contract doctrine that 
prevents contrived threats.  True, ex post, preventing such a contrived threat would 
leave the threatener worse off because Mt > Ct.  But, ex ante, the prospect of 
contrived threats will be priced into the contract and affect the extent of reliance on 
that contract.  To evaluate those effects, consider the following three possible 
consequences of a contrived threat. 
a. Contrived Threats that Induce Modifications that Reduce Joint Welfare.  One 
variation is that a contrived threat might induce a modification that lowers total 
combined value for the parties, which means Cr + Ct > Mr + Mt.  In that case, the 
modification not only lowers joint welfare, but the prospect of such modifications 
will lower the contract’s initial value to the recipient, leading the recipient to 
demand better terms and make lower relationship-specific investments, both of 
which lower the contract’s initial value to the threatener.  Further, the potential 
threatener would know that the recipient could make her own threats of this nature, 
which would leave the threatener worse off.  In short, such welfare-reducing 
threats will be priced into the contract, deter reliance on the contract that benefits 
both parties, and be used against both sides, so that ex ante both parties would be 
better off preventing such threats. 
16 
b. Contrived Threats that Induce Modifications that Increase Joint Welfare.  The 
other variation is that the modification increases total joint value because the 
modification’s benefit to the threatener exceeds its harm to the recipient.  In that 
case, Mt - Ct > Cr - Mr.  But then the threatener does not need to make a threat to 
induce the modification.  The threatener could instead obtain the same 
modification by offering a bonus B that exceeds the recipient’s harm but is lower 
than the threatener’s benefit from the modification, so that Mt - Ct > B > Cr - Mr.  
In short, if the modification increases joint welfare, it can be achieved without 
making any threat (of Tr < Cr) by instead offering a bonus that shares the joint 
gains between the two parties so that Mr + B > Cr.  Thus, preventing contrived 
threats is never necessary for threats that enhance joint welfare. 
c. Contrived Threats That Induce No Modification.   The final possibility is that a 
contrived threat fails to induce a modification, perhaps because the recipient did 
not perceive it to be credible.  If the recipient is mistaken in its perception, then the 
threat will be carried out, which makes both sides worse off because Cr > Tr and 
Ct > Tt.  If the recipient is correct in its perception, then the contract will continue, 
but the parties will have incurred unnecessary costs of conflict and negotiation.  
d. Overall Effect of Banning All Contrived Threats.  In short, preventing all 
contrived threats will prevent some modifications that reduce joint welfare, never 
prevent modifications that increase joint welfare, and prevent some contrived 
threats from being carried out to the detriment of both parties.  Thus, banning all 
contrived threats leaves both parties better off ex ante, without any need to 
examine the welfare effects of the modification. 
One might wonder whether we should also prevent uncontrived warnings because 
they, too, can never be necessary for modifications that enhance joint welfare 
relative to contract performance.  The reason we should not is that although 
uncontrived warnings can indeed produce modifications that lower joint welfare 
relative to contract performance, without the uncontrived warnings we would not 
get contract performance.  Instead, we would get the threatened action, and the 
induced modification does enhance welfare for both parties relative to the situation 
with that threatened action.   
In short, to assess the effects of a threat/warning, we must compare those effects to 
a but-for baseline that reflects the effects that would exist in the world “but for” the 
making of that threat/warning.  For a contrived threat, the effects are negative 
because the but-for baseline is contract performance, which gives higher joint 
value than any modification that requires such a threat.  For an uncontrived 
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warning, the effects are positive because the but-for baseline is a threatened act 
that gives both parties lower value than the modification. 
D. Other Legal Elements 
1. No Reasonable Alternative.  The above analysis establishes that whether a 
threat is legally “improper” should turn on whether it is contrived.  For 
modifications with mutual consideration, duress doctrine also requires proving that 
the threat recipient had “no reasonable alternative,” which means that carrying out 
the threat would have made the recipient significantly worse off.  In other words, 
the no-reasonable-alternative test requires evidence that Cr exceeds Tr by a 
significant enough amount that the threatener can use the threat to induce a 
modification that leaves the recipient significantly worse off than under the 
contract.  This element thus establishes what I noted above was the requisite 
factual premise to show (in a mutual consideration case) that Cr > Mr > Tr, which 
was a necessary premise of the proof above, needed to show the situation involved 
a true threat rather than a bonus.  Alternatively, one might have direct evidence 
that Cr > Mr, in which case can infer that Cr > Tr because Mr > Tr.39  Direct 
evidence that Cr is significantly greater than Mr should thus suffice to satisfy the 
no-reasonable-alternative test.   
Administrative grounds explain why the law requires a significant difference even 
though a small difference could result in some small harm.  In a world with 
costless, perfectly accurate adjudication, all contrived threats would be condemned 
even if the harm were small.  But we do not live in such a world.  A significance 
threshold assures the potential harm is large enough to exceed both litigation costs 
and the overdeterrence effects that can result from inevitable errors in adjudicative 
fact-finding.  This reduces overdeterrence of uncontrived warnings that might be 
mistaken for contrived threats, but at a cost of underdeterring contrived threats 
with small harm.   
For modifications without mutual consideration, contract law does not require 
proving the no-reasonable-alternative test.  This makes sense because, as the proof 
above showed, any modification without mutual consideration necessarily satisfies 
the condition that Cr > Mr > Tr.  Because this automatically follows, litigation cost 
                                           
39 Some argue that the no-reasonable-alternative test is unnecessary because the recipient would never agree to the 
modification unless he had no reasonable alternative.  Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress and 
the Economics of Credible Threats, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 423 (2004).  But that assumes the modification was 
adverse to the recipient when it was made, which is not necessarily true for modifications with mutual consideration. 
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or errors in establishing this condition are likely to be far lower than for 
modifications with mutual consideration. 
If contract law remedies fully satisfied the expectation damages goal of putting the 
recipient in the same position as contract performance, a threat to breach a contract 
would mean Cr = Tr, and thus the necessary premise that Cr > Tr could not be 
satisfied and a recipient would never agree to a modification where Cr > Mr.  
Accordingly, threats to breach a contract can cause the relevant problem only when 
contract remedies are undercompensatory, which alas is often the case given 
litigation costs and delays, uncertain adjudication, limited defendant assets, and 
doctrines that sometimes provide damages below expectations levels.  For 
modifications without mutual consideration, we know that Cr > Mr, so we can 
infer that legal remedies must not have been fully compensatory or the recipient 
would not have agreed to the modification.  For modifications with mutual 
consideration, courts instead often require evidence that the contract remedy is 
significantly undercompensatory.40   
One might think that the underlying problem of inadequate contract remedies 
indicates the solution should be to increase contract remedies rather than have 
doctrines that police modifications.  However, even optimal contract remedies can 
only minimize the sum of underdeterrence and overdeterrence of breaches, thus 
making undercompensatory remedies inevitable in some cases.  Nor will increasing 
contract remedies help in cases where the threatener lacks sufficient assets to pay 
the damages.  In any event, to the extent that actual contract remedies leave Cr > 
Tr, it remains desirable to prevent modifications caused by contrived threats to 
breach a contract.  The fact that different contract remedies might have deterred the 
threat to breach does not alter the desirability of voiding modifications induced by 
contrived threats that are made given actual contract remedies. 
The fact that the underlying problem is inadequate contract remedies also explains 
why, if preventing contrived threats is good for both parties, their initial contracts 
do not simply prohibit contrived threats.  The answer is that the same inadequate 
contract remedies would also fail to deter a breach of any promise not to make 
contrived threats.  The only solution to that problem is to make modifications 
produced by contrived threats unenforceable, which is a solution that only the 
courts can provide because contract law provides that contractual prohibitions on 
future modifications are themselves unenforceable because the parties can always 
agree to modify those prohibitions.41 
                                           
40 Austin, 29 N.Y.2d at 130-131. 
41 Restatement §311 Comment a. 
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2. Lack Objectively Demonstrable Reason or Significant Benefit.  The legal 
standards indicate that a threat is improper and in bad faith unless there is an 
“objectively demonstrable reason” for seeking a modification and a “significant 
benefit” from the threatened action.42  While having a demonstrable reason or 
motive for the threatened action suggests the threat was uncontrived, one might 
wonder about the seeming requirement that the reason must be “objective” and 
produce some concrete benefit.  Why shouldn’t a purely subjective reason, like 
anger or spite, count if that motive would have dictated the threatened action even 
if no threat had been made? 
Suppose the Alaska Packers fishermen and Marston divorcing homebuyers were 
so angry about their situations that (even if no modification were possible) they 
would have taken the threatened action despite the fact that doing so would clearly 
harmed themselves financially.  If so, refusing to enforce such modifications 
because those reasons are subjective would actually harm the recipient if we are 
sure both that (a) these are the facts and (b) the anger itself is not contrived.   
What explains the rule requiring an objective reason or concrete benefit is that both 
those premises are untrue.  First, claims about anger are subjective and easy to 
fake.  Nor would it suffice to ascertain whether the anger was real; one would need 
to quantify its subjective effect to determine whether it would really outweigh the 
financial harm of taking the threatened action.  This creates a proof problem not 
only in hard cases, but also systemically because the proof problem could be 
artificially generated in every case. 
Second, even if anger would genuinely motivate the threatened action, anger might 
itself be endogenous to the desire to create a commitment or reputation that can 
make contrived threats more credible.  Persons might work themselves into a lather 
because their anger makes it credible they will carry out their threats, but their 
anger might itself might be contrived.  Or they might want a reputation for acting 
out of anger when they are crossed so that their contrived threats will be more 
effective.  Either way, anger itself can be contrived, and refusing to enforce 
modifications induced by threats that were produced by contrived anger might thus 
deter those threats from ever being made. 
Thus, although in a world with costless, perfectly accurate adjudication, 
uncontrived warnings should be permissible even when based on nonpecuniary 
motives, in the actual world it is hard to detect anger that is faked or contrived, so 
admitting those motives which would lead to significant underdeterrence of 
contrived threats.  To reduce this underdeterrence, contract law thus has sound 
                                           
42 See supra at __. 
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reasons to deem a threat improper (i.e., contrived) unless the threatened action is 
supported by some objective reason or concrete benefit other than inducing the 
modification, although the necessary cost is to overdeter some genuine emotional 
uncontrived warnings. 
3. Unfair Modification Terms.  Another doctrinal issue is why contract law makes 
the “fairness” of the induced modification relevant to whether it should be 
enforceable.43  Given the proof above, one might think that any contrived threat 
necessarily induces harmful modification and any uncontrived warning induces 
beneficial modification, so that any separate inquiry into the fairness of the 
resulting modification seems unnecessary. 
However, there is a sound reason for this requirement.  Even though the refusal to 
perform a contract may be an uncontrived warning, in that the threatener would 
prefer nonperformance if no modification were possible, a threat not to perform 
unless a particular modification is granted may be contrived because a lesser 
modification would have sufficed to induce performance.44  For example, a cost 
increase might make a party unwilling to perform at the original contract price, but 
a threat not to perform unless given a price increase that vastly exceeds that cost 
increase would still be a contrived threat because a smaller price increase would 
suffice.  Thus, to limit the threatener to the zone of uncontrived warnings, the law 
must also police the “fairness” of the demanded modification.  This explanation 
provides concrete content to what “fairness” means here—it means the 
modification should not exceed the minimum necessary for the threatener to be 
willing to perform the original contract. 
For example, a Restatement illustration indicates that despite a demonstrable 
increase in the market price for metal needed to make a casting, it would be 
improper to threaten to withhold contractual supply of those castings unless the 
contract price were increased from 50 cents to 75 cents, in a case where rivals sold 
the same castings for 55 cents but with several months delay.45  Given the 
demonstrable cost increase, the threat not to perform at the original contract price 
of 50 cents could well be uncontrived, and other Restatement provisions seem to 
treat such threats as proper.46  But the problem here is that the threat was not to 
perform unless the price were increased to 75 cents, which does seem contrived 
because rivals were willing to supply the castings at 55 cents despite the same 
                                           
43 Restatement §89, 176. 
44 Consistent with this conclusion, Restatement provides: “Bad faith may be shown by proving that the person 
making the threat did not believe there was a reasonable basis for the threatened process … or that he realized the 
demand he made was exorbitant.”  Id. §176 Comment d (emphasis added). 
45 Id. §89 Illustration 5. 
46 Id. §89 Illustrations 1-2, 4. 
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increase in market costs for metal.  Thus, although a threat not to perform unless 
the contract price were increased to 55 cents could be an uncontrived warning, a 
threat not to perform unless the contract price were increased to 75 cents was a 
contrived threat. 
E. Why Not Instead Focus on Whether the Threat is Credible? 
Professors Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar argue that contract modifications should 
always be enforced whenever induced by credible threats or by non-credible 
threats that are accurately perceived, limiting potential nonenforceability to non-
credible threats that are inaccurately perceived.47  Other scholars reach a similar 
conclusion.48  Such a credible-threat test differs from a contrived-threat test in 
important ways that make the latter more desirable. 
Whether a threat is contrived turns on a non-threat baseline: if no threat could have 
been communicated, what would the threatener have done?  If she would have 
taken the threatened action, then the threat is uncontrived; if she would not have, 
then the threat is contrived.  Whether a threat is credible instead turns on a post-
threat baseline: after the threat is communicated, would the threatener actually 
carry it out if the modification were rejected?49  If the party would, then their threat 
is credible; if the party would not, then their threat is not credible. 
This is a critical difference because the contrived-threat test is designed to prevent 
such threats from being made in the first place.  A post-threat baseline instead 
assumes the threat would be made either way.50  The tests reach different results in 
cases when, if no threat could be made, the threatener would not take the 
threatened action, but if a threat were made, the threatener would carry it out.  In 
such cases, the threat is contrived but credible, and a credibility test would thus 
wrongly enforce any modification it induces.  In contrast, my contrived-threat test 
would not enforce the induced modification because denying threateners any 
                                           
47 Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress, supra note , at 392-94, 417; Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Credible 
Coercion, supra note , at 717, 720, 727-728, 730-732, 744, 752. 
48 Daniel A. Graham & Ellen R. Peirce, Contract Modification: an Economic Analysis of the Hold-Up Game, 52 L. 
& CONTEMPORARY PROBS. 9, 11-12, 23 (1989). 
49 Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, supra note , at 722 (“Credibility is evaluated with an eye to the 
hypothetical temporal moment when the threat fails to induce the threatened party to surrender...”); id. at 742 (“Our 
analysis suggests that the correct baseline … is not the position of the threatened party prior to the threat, but rather 
the position that she would be in if she were to reject the threat.”); id. 742 n.41 (stressing that they are using a “post-
threat baseline”). 
50 Id. at 742 (observing that their “position takes the existence of a threat to be part of the unfortunate but relevant 
reality in which the dilemma has to be resolved.”) 
22 
benefits from making such threats would desirably deter such threats from ever 
being made. 
1. Why Contrived Threats Can Be Credible.  A contrived threat can be credible 
whenever the act of making the threat makes the party more likely to take the 
threatened action if no modification is given.  Making a threat can have this effect 
for many reasons. 
a. A Contrived Threat Can Be Credible When Staged.  A contrived threat not to 
perform a contract is generally carried out in stages that make it credible because 
the victim’s refusal to modify at each stage is itself not credible.51  Suppose, for 
example, that withholding performance is unprofitable standing alone, so that a 
one-time threat not to ever perform might not seem credible.  Nonetheless, a 
threatener usually withholds contract performance only one day at a time.  The 
threat to continue doing so each day is credible when a victim has no reasonable 
alternative because each day the victim’s refusal to modify is not credible given 
that the victim is harmed each day he refuses to modify.  Moreover, the threatener 
usually suffers harm only later if the victim sues or does not pay, possibilities that 
can be discounted because they would require the victim to follow through with a 
noncredible threat to refuse modification. Thus, continuing to withhold 
performance can, even though unprofitable standing alone, become profitable (and 
thus credible) because it is expected to result in a profitable modification.  In a 
sense, the threat is credible each day because it creates a profitable reputation for 
credibility on following days.52   
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge that such a staged breach would be credible 
even though each stage is costly to the threatener, but because they employ a 
credibility test they reach the mistaken conclusion that modifications induced by 
such breaches should be enforceable.53  Their conclusion is mistaken because 
enforcing the modification encourages such contrived threats even though the 
prospect of them makes both parties worse off.  A contrived-threat test instead 
correctly denies enforcement to the modification because no stage of the threatened 
                                           
51 Lucian Bebchuk established a similar point for threats to sue.  Lucian Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the 
Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1996).  Threats of contract nonperformance are even 
more credible than litigation threats because while in Bebchuk’s model both sides incur equal costs at each litigation 
stage, in the contract situation usually the victims immediately incur large costs from nonperformance while the 
threatener incurs costs only later if the victim sues or does not pay. 
52 The same theory works for more violent threats.  The loan shark need not resort immediately to killing the 
nonpaying customer.  Taking one finger off at a time can be more effective.  Even though carrying out each threat to 
amputate a finger is unprofitable standing alone, it becomes profitable (and thus credible) because carrying out such 
a threat is likely to convince the victim that other fingers will follow and thus induce him to pay up. 
53 Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress, supra note , at 417, 420-421 (concluding that any modification 
induced by a credible threat should be enforced and that threatening such a staged breach is credible). 
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action would have occurred without the prospect of such a modification, given that 
each stage of the threatened action is unprofitable but for its ability to induce 
modification. 
b. A Contrived Threat Can Be Credible Because It Creates a Reputation For 
Carrying Out Future Threats.  Once a threat is made, failing to carry it out can 
have reputational effects for future threats.  It can thus be credible that a threatener 
will carry out a contrived threat (even though the threatened action is directly 
unprofitable) because the threatener profits from enhancing the credibility of their 
future threats. 
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge not only that this factor can make 
unprofitable threats credible, but also that it creates an endogeneity problem for 
their approach because it means that whether a threat is credible can depend on 
whether contract law enforces modifications induced by such threats.54  Suppose 
carrying out a threat will reduce profits unless it enhances a reputation for carrying 
out similar threats will lead to future profitable modifications.  If so, then the 
credibility of the threat turns entirely on whether contract law will enforce such 
modifications.  If contract law does, then the threat is credible and the credibility 
test concludes that contract law correctly enforces such modifications.  If contract 
law does not, then the threat is not credible and the credibility test concludes that 
contract law correctly refuses to enforce such modifications.  Either conclusion is 
consistent with their test, which thus offers no basis for choosing among them.  In 
other words, because their credibility test depends on whether contract law does 
enforce the threat, it cannot provide independent grounds for whether contract law 
should enforce the threat. 
Although Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar correctly conclude that analysis should take 
this endogeneity problem into account, their crediblity test offers no answer to the 
question of which of the endogenous solutions one should choose.  The answer 
instead depends on whether deterring the threat is desirable or not, which a 
crediblity test does not answer because credible threats can be both contrived (and 
thus harmful) or uncontrived (and thus beneficial).   
A contrived-threat test, in contrast, avoids any endogeneity problem.  Contrived 
threats should make modifications unenforceable because in the no-threat world 
the threatened action would not occur.  Thus, no reputation could be developed and 
profits from similar future modifications would be unavailable.  The contrived-
threat test accordingly always provides a clear conclusion that contract law should 
                                           
54 Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, supra note , at 725-726. 
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void modifications induced by such contrived threats, no matter how credible they 
may be. 
c. A Contrived Threat Can Be Credible Because Making the Threat Creates 
Emotional Benefits To Carrying It Out.  Given human nature, the mere act of 
making a threat can alter the psychic benefits of carrying it out.  A person who fails 
to carry out a threat loses face and may feel obliged to live up to his threat.  Indeed, 
a party may develop a character for carrying out her threats precisely because it 
makes her threats more credible in ways that are beneficial to her.  Developing 
such a character can give parties psychic benefits from carrying out a threat that 
causes parties to do so even when there are no future reputational benefits.55   
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge that emotional factors can make it credible 
to carry out an unprofitable threat.56  However, they do not consider the possibility 
that making the threat can itself change the emotional calculus.  A threat would be 
contrived if, absent making any threat, the psychic benefits would not suffice to 
take the unprofitable action.  But making this contrived threat can increase the 
psychic benefits from taking that action in a way that offsets the lost profits and 
thus make the threat credible.  Under the credibility test, this would make 
modifications induced by such threats enforceable, which would encourage such 
contrived threats because those modifications are profitable for the threatener.  In 
contrast, under the contrived-threat test, the threatener has no incentive to make the 
threat in the first place given that any modification would be unenforceable.  The 
credibility test is thus less desirable because the proof above shows that such 
contrived threats can only harm both parties. 
d. A Contrived Threat Can Be Credible Because of Efforts to Improve the 
Threat’s Credibility.  Contrived threats can be made in ways that create formal 
commitments to carry them out and thus make them credible.  Threateners might 
also take earlier steps that increase the credibility of their contrived threats.  For 
example, if a threat to breach would be contrived because the prospect of damages 
makes breach unprofitable, the threatener can take on debt that reduces the 
expected damages.  Alternatively, if a threat to breach would be contrived because 
performance would be profitable, a party could take steps to increase its costs (or 
fail avoid such increases) in order to make performance unprofitable and thus 
make a threat to breach credible. 
                                           
55 For example, a loan shark might find it advantageous to develop a character for severely punishing nonpayment, 
and that character may thus cause him to carry out a threat to kill someone who declines to pay, even though he 
hides the killing in a way that means it can have no reputational effects.   
56 Id. at 726-727, 756-757; Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Threatening an “Irrational” Breach of Contract, 11 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143 (2004). 
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Such efforts may ultimately make a threat credible and thus make modifications 
induced by it enforceable under a credibility test.  If those modifications are 
sufficiently profitable to the threatener, they can make such efforts worthwhile 
even though the efforts would be unprofitable if the party were unable to make the 
threat.  Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge this effect is both possible and 
undesirable, and they recommend deviating from their credibility test when a party 
engages in efforts to make its threat more credible.57  A contrived-threat test would 
instead directly lead to the desirable conclusion because, absent an ability to make 
the threat, such unprofitable efforts to make a threat more credible would not 
occur.  Thus, without the ability to communicate such threats, neither those 
contrived efforts nor the threatened action would occur.  The threat is thus 
contrived and modifications induced by it should be unenforceable.58 
e. A Contrived Threat Can Be Credible When There Are Low Odds of Great 
Harm.  A contrived threat that is very unlikely to be carried out can still be 
credible enough to induce agreement given the magnitude of the threatened harm.  
For example, suppose someone puts a gun to your head unless you agree to modify 
a contract.  Carrying out the threat harms the threatener because pulling the trigger 
gets them nothing, incurs legal risks, and costs a bullet.  But suppose there are 1% 
odds the threatener will carry out the threat because of reputational effects or 
because he may be irrational, deranged, or on drugs.  Even if you accurately 
perceive those low odds, you would likely consent to modification because a 1% 
risk of death exceeds the harm from the modification.  The threat can thus be 
credible enough to induce modification even though (like here) it is clearly 
contrived.  A contrived-threat test instead makes the modification void and thus 
eliminates any incentive to make the threat in the first place.  Enforcing such 
modifications would instead encourage such threats, which clearly seems 
undesirable. 
2. Why Contrived Threats Should Be Deterred Even If Not Credible.  Bar-Gill 
and Ben-Shahar’s theory also had problematic implications for non-credible 
threats.  First, they conclude that modifications produced by non-credible threats 
should also be enforceable whenever victims accurately perceived the non-
                                           
57 Id. at 732-734; Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress, supra note , at 415-417; see also Mark Seidenfeld & 
Murat Mungan, Duress as Rent-Seeking, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (concluding that credible threats should 
be deemed wrongful when the costs of making the threat credible and carrying it out exceed the benefits of the 
threatened action). 
58 Consistent with my conclusion, courts have interpreted the good faith requirement of a “legitimate commercial 
reason” to mean a reason “outside the control of the party seeking modification.”  T & S Brass & Bronze Works, 
Inc. v. Pic-Air, Inc., 790 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1986).  Thus, a party cannot bootstrap itself into a valid reason 
for breaching by contrived efforts to incur costs or debts or commitments that make performance unprofitable. 
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credibility of the threat.59  They reason that in such cases the threat could not have 
induced the modification.  Their approach thus limits the possible scope of duress 
doctrine to non-credible threats that the victim wrongly perceived to be credible. 
Efforts to make contrived threats look credible are certainly harmful.  For example, 
a threatener might claim its costs or debts are higher than they are, suggesting it is 
likely to breach if no modification is obtained, even though breach is in fact 
unprofitable.60   Such claims are directly policed by contract doctrines that deem 
threats in bad faith when they are dishonest in fact.61  However, as the preceding 
section showed, a contrived threat can be credible even if the threatener is 
completely honest about its situation, so contract law correctly also deems threats 
to be bad faith whenever unsupported by objective reasons that would produce 
breach. 
Nor is there any reason for the law get into complicated inquiries about whether a 
contrived threat was perceived to be credible.  We are always better off if such a 
contrived threat were not made, rather than forcing the other side to guess about its 
credibility.  If the contrived threat induces an adverse modification, it must have 
been perceived to be credible enough.  As noted above, a threat can be credible 
enough even if the victim knows the odds are very low it will be carried out and 
even if fully carrying out the threat is clearly unprofitable but the threat can be 
made in steps.  Courts inquiring about victim perceptions will often make errors, 
and may even suffer from hindsight bias because courts will have access to 
information that the victim did not have about the threat’s credibility.  
Moreover, even a contrived threat that fails to induce modification is harmful.  If 
the contrived threat fails to induce modification because the victim wrongly 
perceived it was not credible, then the threat will be carried out, the prospect of 
which harms both parties ex ante.  If the contrived threat fails to induce 
modification because the victim correctly perceived it was not credible, there is no 
still no benefit to allowing the threat, and indeed some harm because it leads to 
unnecessary conflict and negotiation costs.  Because contrived threats never have 
any benefit and can create great harm, it is better for contract law to always deter 
them by eliminating any potential modification gains from making them. 
Second, Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s approach produces no theory about which of 
the non-credible threats that are wrongly perceived to be credible should make 
                                           
59 Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress, supra note , at 393-394, 402; Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Credible 
Coercion, supra note , at 727-728, 730-731. 
60 Graham & Pierce, supra note , at 11, 23. 
61 Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp, 705 F.2d 134, 146 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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induced modifications voidable; instead, they conclude that this issue turns on 
normative considerations beyond their analysis.62  My analysis provides a clearer 
conclusion.  All modifications induced by contrived threats should be void, 
whether or not that contrived threat was credible. 
3. The Credibility Test Does Not Fit Contract Law.  A final advantage of the 
contrived-threat test is that it fits well with existing contract law results, explaining 
why contrived threats are improper regardless of whether they will be carried out.  
In contrast, as Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge, their theory conflicts with 
current contract law.63  Indeed, their insistence that credible threats should never 
void modifications directly conflicts with the no-reasonable-alternative element, 
because credible threats are the ones most likely to leave victims with no 
reasonable alternative.  Their approach thus immunizes the worst kind of contrived 
threat: a credible one that will be carried out only because the threat was made.  
Current law also eschews any separate inquiry into whether a reasonable person 
would have perceived the threat to be credible, concluding (as I do) that it suffices 
if the threat actually induced the modification.64 
F. Comparing Other Proposed Tests 
1. Nozick and Schelling on Threats v. Warning.  My contrived-threat test is partly 
related to the distinction that Robert Nozick, Thomas Schelling, and others have 
drawn between impermissible “threats” and permissible “offers” and “warnings.”65  
Nozick’s is particularly important because it has influenced legal scholarship on 
contractual duress and unconstitutional conditions.  However, their distinction and 
analyses differ from mine in various important respects. 
First, while I use a pure prediction baseline to measure threats and warnings, 
Nozick and other philosophers combine a prediction baseline with a moral 
baseline, and thus condemn some “threats” that I would deem uncontrived 
warnings.  Although Nozick defines an impermissible “threat” to exist when the 
threatened conduct would leave the recipient worse off than the “expected” course 
                                           
62 Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, supra note , at 744 (“While we argue that whenever a threat is 
credible the deal should be enforced, we do not argue that whenever a threat is not credible, the deal should not be 
enforced… A normative theory … is necessary to determine which among these noncredible threats are coercive.”); 
id. at 731-32. 
63 Id. at 719, 721, 737, 753-754; Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress, supra note , at 392-394, 422-423. 
64 Restatement §175 Comment c (“the question is, did the threat actually induce assent on the part of the person 
claiming to be the victim of duress…   it is not essential that a reasonable person would have believed that the maker 
of the threat had the ability to execute it…”). 
65 Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD 440, 447-458 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 
1969); THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 123-24 n.5 (1960). 
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of events, he defines “expected” to “straddle predicted and morally required.”66  
Thus, his definition of an impermissible threat includes adverse deviations not only 
from what predictably would occur without any threat (which I would call a 
contrived threat) but also from what is “morally required” even though it conforms 
to what would predictably occur without the threat (thus including what I deem 
uncontrived warnings). 
One problem with Nozick’s definition is that he never defines what is “morally 
required” (which he equates with “morally expected”), which adds a vague, 
conclusory element to his analysis.67  Indeed, the typical contract modification is 
induced by threats to breach, which some might argue always deviates from what 
is morally expected,68 which would mean such threats are always impermissible 
and the modifications are always voidable.69   This would conflict with current law 
and be undesirable because the proof above shows that enforcing modifications 
induced by uncontrived “threats” is desirable. 
No matter what he means by it, Nozick’s moral prong has bite only when it deems 
threats impermissible even when the threatened action conforms to the predicted 
course of events; that is, only when it condemns uncontrived “threats.”70  The 
above proof shows this bite is undesirable.  To be sure, such uncontrived threats by 
supposition threaten action that deviates from some (unspecified) moral norm, 
which makes them undesirable relative to compliance with that moral norm.  But 
that moral deviation will by definition occur if the law prevents communication of 
uncontrived “threats” to take that deviant action.  Thus, enforcing modifications 
induced by such uncontrived “threats” to engage in immoral action will not only 
reduce such immoral conduct but also leave both parties better off, given the 
morally unacceptable conduct that would occur if such modifications could not be 
enforced. 
The fact that the threatened immoral conduct would occur may suggest that the 
underlying problem is that the law does not sufficiently penalize that conduct.  But 
                                           
66 Nozick, supra note , at 447, 450 (emphasis in original).  Other scholars likewise define threats by combining 
prediction and moral baselines.  See, e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 206-221 (1988); Scott Altman, Divorcing 
Threats and Offers, 15 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 209 (1996). 
67 Nozick, supra note , at 450 (“In some such situations it will be unclear what P is morally expected to do, and 
hence unclear whether his statement is a threat or an offer.”). 
68 Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007). 
69 If a threat adversely deviates from what is morally expected but not from what is predicted, Nozick condemns the 
threat whenever the victim would prefer what is morally expected to what is predicted.  Nozick, supra note , at 451.  
Thus, if performance were morally expected, Nozick would always condemn threats to breach because victims 
prefer contract performance to breach. 
70 If a threat adversely deviates from what is predicted, Nozick condemns the threat even if it does not deviate from 
what is morally required.  Id. at 453.  Thus, the only effect his morally-required prong can have is to condemn some 
threats that the predicted prong would not. 
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the remedy for that is increasing that penalty.  If penalties are not sufficiently large 
to deter the immoral conduct, banning uncontrived warnings about that conduct 
will merely assure that the immoral conduct occurs instead of preferable 
modifications.  Moreover, there are usually good reasons why the law does not 
impose greater penalties on immoral conduct, such as the fear that imprecision in 
application of the law will also deter desirable conduct.  Thus, even optimal legal 
regulation will leave undeterred some immoral conduct, the harm of which could 
be reduced by enforcing modifications induced by uncontrived warnings about that 
conduct. 
Second, these scholars often use a different prediction baseline than I do.  
Although in parts Nozick uses the same no-threat baseline as me,71 in other parts 
he and other philosophers use a pre-threat baseline that turns on what the victim 
would have expected to occur before the threat was made.72  Given that just about 
every victim expects contract performance before they hear about a threat to 
breach, this pre-threat expectation test would condemn all contract modifications 
induced by a threat of breach.  This would not only deviate from actual contract 
law, but would condemn desirable uncontrived warnings whenever the warning 
was unexpected by the victim.  Deterring such unexpected warnings would thus 
increase unexpected harm to the victim and prevent mutually desirable 
modifications to avoid it.  Schelling uses a different pre-threat baseline to define a 
“warning,” which turns on whether, immediately before making the threat, the 
threatener would have found it in its interests to take the threatened action.73  His 
definition of a “warning” would thus include cases where parties make contrived 
commitments that give them independent incentives to take the threatened action, 
which I noted above should be condemned as contrived threats.74  Schelling also 
draws no normative conclusions about what he calls threats because his work is 
instead about analyzing (quite brilliantly) the credibility and effectiveness of 
threats. 
Third, Nozick concludes that contrived threats should be deemed permissible 
“offers” when they induce agreements that the recipient itself feels leaves him 
better off than the predicted course of events.75  That is, even if a contrived threat 
results in Cr > Tr, he concludes it should count as a permissible offer if Mr > Cr. 
                                           
71 Id. at 453-457. 
72 Id. at 447-453; WERTHEIMER, supra note , at 207. 
73 SCHELLING, supra note , at 123-124 n.5. 
74 See supra at __. 
75 Nozick, supra note , Id. at 448-449. 
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However, there is no benefit from creating a legal exception for contrived threats 
that induce modifications that leave the recipient better off.  If it were really true 
that Mr > Cr, then the threatener could always induce the modification without any 
contrived threat.  Indeed, the fact that the threatener felt a threat was needed 
suggests that she really believed Cr > Mr.  The best way to test whether the 
recipient really believes Mr > Cr would be to prevent contrived threats that leave 
the recipient worse off than Cr.  This preserves the recipient’s autonomy right to 
choose for himself whether he prefers the modification, rather than having that 
right turn on whether a court concludes the recipient really believes the 
modification made him worse off. 
Fourth, and related to all the above points, Nozick believes that the distinction 
between impermissible threats and permissible offers or warnings is inescapably 
normative.  Many other scholars have shared this view.76  In my account, however, 
the distinction is purely empirical: it turns solely on what, in a no-threat world, the 
threatener would have done.  This empirical distinction has, as proven above, clear 
normative implications given the consequences that flow from it.  But the 
distinction is a factual one that does not require independent normative criteria.  
That is critical because we are dealing with threatened actions that are otherwise 
lawful and thus by definition within bounds where contract law and constitutional 
law allow parties and governments to pursue their own normative goals. 
2. Changed Circumstances.  Other leading scholars conclude that the 
enforceability of modifications should depend on the existence of various types of 
changed circumstances.  Although such changed circumstances often correctly 
indicate an uncontrived warning that should lead to enforceability, their tests are 
under- and over-inclusive. 
Alan Schwartz concludes that modifications should be enforceable when prompted 
by any changed circumstances.77  However, many changed circumstances will not 
even make performance unprofitable, let alone so unprofitable that threateners 
would not perform even if modification were impossible.  Unless it does so, threats 
not to perform are contrived threats despite changed circumstances, and enforcing 
such modifications under Schwartz’s over-inclusive test will thus encourage 
contrived threats with undesirable consequences. 
                                           
76 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 95-99 (1981); Sullivan, supra note __, at 1446 n.133 (collecting 
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77 Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts and the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial 
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Richard Posner concludes modifications should be enforceable when changed 
circumstances make performance by a willing party impossible without a 
modification.78  However, even if performance is possible, it will not actually 
occur if changed circumstances make performance less profitable than breach.  In 
such cases, the threat to breach is an uncontrived warning and failing to enforce 
modifications under Posner’s under-inclusive test will thus lead to breaches that 
both parties find worse than modification. 
Aivazin, Trebilcock, and Penny conclude that modifications should be enforceable 
only when changed circumstances affect risks that are both remote and for which 
the threat recipients are superior risk bearers.79  They reason that other 
modifications reallocate contractual risks away from superior risk bearers.  
However, even when their test is not met, threateners would (if modification is 
impossible) still breach when that is more profitable than performance.  When that 
is so, threats to breach are uncontrived warnings and their underinclusive test will 
prevent desirable modifications.  True, modifications induced by such contrived 
warnings may, as they argue, reallocate risks in a way that is less efficient than the 
original contracts.  But if the modifications are prevented, we will not get 
performance of the original contracts.  We will get breaches that both parties 
regard as worse than the modifications.  Aivazin, Trebilcock, and Penny worry that 
the prospect of risk reallocation through modification will reduce the threateners’ 
incentives to avoid risks that make them want to breach.80  But the contrived-threat 
test eliminates that concern by deeming threats contrived if nonperformance 
became advantageous only because of changed circumstances that resulted from 
contrived decisions that the threatener would have found unprofitable but for the 
ability to make a threat that induces modification.81 
Jason Johnston concludes modifications should be enforceable only when sought 
because changed circumstances made performance of the original contract 
unprofitable.82  Although such changes in circumstances often indicate an 
uncontrived warning, his test is both under- and over-inclusive. 
First, even if changed circumstances make performance of the original contract 
unprofitable, sometimes the prospect of paying expectation damages is even less 
profitable.  In such situations, threats not to perform are contrived despite those 
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changed circumstances, and enforcing modifications under Johnston’s test will 
encourage such contrived threats, with undesirable consequences.  Thus, courts are 
right to require further evidence that unprofitability really would have led to 
nonperformance even if no modification were possible.83 
Second, even if changed circumstances do not make performance of the original 
contract unprofitable, threats not to perform may be uncontrived warnings.  For 
example, suppose performing the contract remains profitable, but a third party has 
offered a higher price that would be even more profitable.  Suppose further that the 
threatener prefers to take the higher price (and risk contract damages) over 
performing the original contract.  If so, threats not to perform are uncontrived 
warnings and refusing to enforce modifications will thus undesirably lead to 
breaches that make both parties worse off.  Thus, contract law is right to enforce 
modifications when a party would otherwise take an even more profitable offer.84 
Third, even if changed circumstances make performance of the original contract 
unprofitable, that may not justify modifications induced by contrived threats 
unrelated to performance.  For example, in Wolf the buyers’ divorce was a changed 
circumstance that made performance unprofitable because now they had to resell.85  
But their threat was not to breach, but rather to complete the house purchase and 
then re-sell to an undesirable purchaser, which was even more unprofitable.  That 
threat remains contrived and thus the court was correct not to enforce the 
modification. 
 
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
A. Unconstitutional Conditions Affecting States 
The Medicaid defunding decision follows straightforwardly from the above 
contractual analysis.  As the Court noted, its Spending Clause precedent 
incorporate contract law standards on duress, viewing the relationship between the 
federal government and the States as contractual in nature.86  As Part I showed, the 
                                           
83 See supra at __.   
84 See supra at __.  Posner would go even further and enforce any modification if the threat to terminate was 
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threat to defund Medicaid unless States accepted the Medicaid Expansion violated 
those contract law standards if (1) the threat was contrived (and thus “improper”) 
and (2) carrying out the threat would have left the States significantly worse off 
(thus meaning they had “no reasonable alternative” but to agree). 
1. Findings Showing a Contrived Threat.  Much of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion 
focused on the second element because it was important to distinguish some key 
precedent.  But before doing so, he offered an analysis that established the first 
element for the threat to take away pre-existing Medicaid funds, stating: 
[1] The States claim that this threat serves no purpose other than to force 
unwilling States to sign up for the dramatic expansion in health care 
coverage effected by the Act.   Given the nature of the threat and the 
programs at issue here, we must agree.  [2] We have upheld Congress’s 
authority to condition the receipt of funds on the States’ complying with 
restrictions on the use of those funds, because that is the means by which 
Congress ensures that the funds are spent according to its view of the 
‘‘general Welfare.’’  [3] Conditions that do not here govern the use of the 
funds, however, cannot be justified on that basis. When, for example, such 
conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent 
grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the 
States to accept policy changes.87 
Proposition [1] was a finding that the threat had “no purpose” but to force States to 
accept the modification.88  This finding means the threat was contrived; i.e., that 
absent an ability to make the threat, Congress would not have terminated pre-
existing Medicaid.  Proposition [2] further indicates that threats are acceptable 
when they reflect Congress’s view that use of its funds advances the general 
welfare only if certain conditions are met.  Such a view would indicate that 
Congress would find cutting off funding preferable to continuing it without 
conditions, which would make a threat to cut off funding an uncontrived warning 
of what Congress would do if attaching the condition were impossible.  Proposition 
[3] concludes that this is not the case when Congress threatens to terminate 
significant independent grants, which Congress would have no reason to 
discontinue but for the fact that the threat pressures States to agree to a change, 
thus indicating a contrived threat. 
                                                                                                                                        
federal government could, it would not matter whether the defunding threat was coercive because coercion would be 
permissible. 
87 Id. at 2603-04 (brackets added). 
88 For a similar conclusion, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study 
in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1323, 1334-35 (2013). 
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The conclusion that the threat to eliminate pre-existing Medicaid funds was 
contrived seems entirely correct.  There was no evidence that any significant 
faction in Congress (let alone a Congressional majority) preferred eliminating 
Medicaid over having pre-existing Medicaid continue.  The threat to defund pre-
existing Medicaid was thus a contrived threat to engage in action that Congress 
would not have engaged in if unable to make the threat.  Indeed, now that the 
Supreme Court has prevented the Secretary of Health and Human Services from 
threatening to eliminate Medicaid to induce states to accept the Medicaid 
Expansion, we have not seen any Congressional movement to eliminate Medicaid, 
even though Congress has only gotten more conservative since the Congress that 
enacted Obamacare.  To put it another way, Congress’ clear preference ranking 
was Medicaid Expansion > Pre-Existing Medicaid > No Medicaid.  If unable to 
impose Medicaid Expansion, then Congress would continue pre-existing Medicaid.  
Thus the threat to instead eliminate pre-existing Medicaid was a contrived threat 
that penalized State choices not to accept the Medicaid Expansion.  Indeed, Robert 
explicitly confirmed he thought the threat was contrived when he concluded that 
(absent the condition) “practical constraints would plainly inhibit, if not preclude, 
the Federal Government from repealing the existing program.”89 
Conversely, suppose we lived in a different world where Congress really thought 
that pre-existing Medicaid was working so poorly that the nation was better off 
eliminating it rather than allowing it to continue, but also thought that the Medicaid 
Expansion would be better than both options.  That is, suppose its preference 
ranking were Medicaid Expansion > No Medicaid > Pre-Existing Medicaid.  In 
that imaginary world, the threat to eliminate Medicaid would be an uncontrived 
warning and thus constitutional.  This is desirable because if the law prevented 
Congress from communicating such an uncontrived warning, Congress would have 
eliminated Medicaid.  That by definition would leave the States worse off, because 
they preferred agreeing to the Medicaid Expansion to having Medicaid eliminated. 
The case also involved an uncontrived warning that the Court did sustain.  Namely, 
the Court held Congress could threaten to withhold new Medicaid funds from 
States that would not agree to Medicaid Expansion.90  That threat was an 
uncontrived warning because the only reason Congress was willing to offer the 
new funds was to get the Medicaid Expansion.  Thus, if Congress could not 
condition those new funds on the States expanding Medicaid, then Congress would 
not provide the new funds at all.   In other words, Congress’ preference ranking 
was Medicaid Expansion > Pre-Existing Medicaid > Additional Funding Without 
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Medicaid Expansion.  If threats to induce Medicaid Expansion were impossible, 
this ranking means Congress would just provide States with pre-existing Medicaid 
funding, which was the uncontrived threat the Court allowed.  Because some States 
preferred Medicaid Expansion with the new funds over Pre-Existing Medicaid, 
denying them the option of the former would just make those States (and 
Congress) worse off. 
Roberts again confirmed this analysis because he concluded that while the threat to 
withhold new Medicaid funds was “offering” funds, the threat to deny existing 
Medicaid funds would “penalize” States.91  This distinction would not make sense 
if he was determining whether a threat was an offer or penalty relative to a baseline 
of what Congress legally could do because Congress could legally withhold either 
source of funds.  But it does make sense if we understand Roberts to be using a 
baseline of what Congress would have done absent the condition. 
Further confirmation was provided because Roberts’ analysis of Steward Machine 
Co. v. Davis92 concluded that the threat there was constitutional for reasons that 
showed it was an uncontrived warning.  In Steward, Congress assessed a tax to 
fund federal unemployment insurance, but gave a tax credit to employers who paid 
into state unemployment plans.  The Supreme Court held that the threat to 
withhold tax credits from employers in States without unemployment plans did not 
coerce States to adopt unemployment plans.93  As Roberts correctly observed, that 
holding rested on the premise that “Congress was willing to direct businesses to 
instead pay the money into state programs only on the condition that the money be 
used for the same purposes.”94   This premise meant that the threat to withhold tax 
credits was an uncontrived warning because, if Congress had no ability to obtain 
the condition, Congress would have provided no tax credit rather than give 
unconditioned tax credits. 
To put it another way, in Steward Congress’ preference ranking was Conditioned 
Tax Credits > No Tax Credits > Unconditioned Tax Credits.  Thus, the threat to 
deny tax credits was just an uncontrived warning of what would happen if tax 
credits could not be conditioned on states providing unemployment insurance.  
Prohibiting the conditioned tax credits would thus leave the States who accepted 
them worse off because their acceptance showed that they preferred the tax credits 
with conditions to no tax credits at all.  In other words, offering the conditioned tax 
credits to States added an option they might prefer to the zero tax credits they 
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would otherwise get, rather than penalizing a choice not to adopt state 
unemployment insurance by withholding unconditioned tax credits that would 
otherwise be forthcoming.  Accordingly, Steward correctly concluded that there 
Congress was using “temptation” (adding options preferable to the but-for world) 
rather than “coercion” (imposing penalties worse than the but-for world).95 
The joint opinion wrongly suggested in dicta that the sole test of coercion was 
whether the no-reasonable-choice test was met.96  That test could condemn 
uncontrived warnings about denials of funding or tax credits, which would leave 
States worse off because the States would then suffer those denials even when they 
prefer to agree to the conditions necessary to avoid them.  It would also deviate 
from the underlying contract law principles (which the joint opinion agreed 
applied) because those principles also require a contrived (i.e., improper) threat.  
However, this suggestion was dicta because other parts of the joint opinion indicate 
those justices believed the actual Congressional threat to eliminate pre-existing 
Medicaid was contrived, stating that “Congress surely” did not want to leave our 
“most vulnerable groups ... out in the cold” by eliminating Medicaid in States that 
did not accept the Expansion.97  Because the actual threat was contrived, 
eliminating the ability to make it would not (and did not) result in an elimination of 
Medicaid that would harm the States.  In any event, because the votes in the 
Robert’s opinion were necessary for the judgment, they limit the holding of 
unconstitutionality to threats that not only leave States with no reasonable choice 
but are also contrived. 
2. The Lack of a Reasonable Alternative.  The rest of Roberts’ analysis 
established the no-reasonable-alternative element, finding that States had “no real 
option but to acquiesce” because eliminating federal Medicaid funding threatened 
a “loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget.”98  This finding confirms that 
(as under contract law) the Spending Clause version of this element merely 
requires showing that carrying out the threat would have left the victim 
significantly worse off.  Roberts distinguished South Dakota v. Dole99 on the 
ground that there the threat was to eliminate funding that was less than 0.5% of the 
State’s budget.100  The opinion thus suggests that losing less than 0.5% of a State’s 
budget does not leave it “significantly” worse off, but that losing 10% of a State’s 
budget does.   
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As noted above, where to draw the line on what counts as a significant difference 
turns on administrative grounds related to litigation costs and concerns that 
inevitable inaccuracies in adjudication (such as incorrectly finding a threat 
contrived) might create overdeterrence problems.101  It thus makes sense to limit 
the doctrine to cases with significant underdeterrence concerns, and if carrying out 
a threat would leave States less than 0.5% worse off, then modifications induced 
by that threat cannot harm States any more than that. 
3. The Critiques.  The Government argued that the threat was uncoercive because 
the Medicaid Expansion was so generous that it left the States better off.102  This 
parallels the Nozick argument that I rejected above: that a contrived threat should 
be deemed a permissible offer if it compels a party to accept an agreement that 
makes it better off.103  As the joint opinion pointed, if the States really believed that 
the Expansion left them better off, then a threat to take away pre-existing Medicaid 
funds would have been unnecessary.104  The fact that (with the threat now 
removed) many States have not accepted the Medicaid Expansion confirms they 
must not actually prefer the Expansion to pre-existing Medicaid.  To be sure, many 
argue this choice is financially irrational given the huge share of federal funding 
for that expansion.  But the legal premise for coercion analysis is that States have a 
constitutional autonomy right to choose for themselves whether to accept the 
Medicaid Expansion,105 and in making autonomous choices, States are free to 
either assess the financial implications differently or make decisions based on 
reasons unrelated to finances.  Sometimes we admire such decisions as standing on 
principle.  To allow such contrived threats when the federal government and courts 
believe the end result makes the States better off, but the States do not, would 
violate the posited constitutional autonomy right. 
Justice Ginsburg argued that the threat could not be coercive because Congress has 
the legal right to eliminate Medicaid funding.106  But Spending Clause cases 
incorporate contract law principles, and her argument conflicts with the contract 
law principle that a threat to engage in otherwise lawful action can be coercive 
when it is contrived and leaves the victim no reasonable choice but to agree.107  
Her argument also conflicts with unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which 
invalidates many threats to take action (like cutting off funding) that is itself 
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perfectly legal.108  These doctrines are correct because no matter what Congress 
legally could do, a threat that deviates from what Congress would do without the 
challenged condition imposes a penalty on the State’s constitutional choice. 
Ginsburg also argued that the threat was not coercive because ‘‘Congress has not 
threatened to withhold funds earmarked for any other program.’’109  Roberts 
disputed her premise, concluding that pre-existing Medicaid and the Expansion 
were so different that they were not “all one program.”110  How can we tell whether 
programs are separate?  The answer cannot turn, as Roberts correctly concluded, 
on how Congress “styled” the programs because the whole point is to impose some 
limit on Congress’ power.111  The answer must instead depend on why it 
functionally matters whether programs are separate.  The reason it matters is that if 
the threatened cutoff concerns an independent program, there is generally no 
reason to think that (absent linkage to the threat) Congress would have wanted to 
discontinue that independent program, which means the threat to do so is likely 
contrived.  Thus, whether pre-existing Medicaid should count as an independent 
program from the Expansion turns not on formalisms, but on whether we think 
Congress would have preferred to continue pre-existing Medicaid in a world where 
it could not be linked to the Expansion.  Because Congress clearly would have, the 
two should count as separate programs.   
Ginsburg further claimed that the Court’s holding made no sense because Congress 
could instead have first repealed Medicaid and then offered a new Medicaid with 
the Expansion.112  However, her premise again conflicts with contract law 
principles, which have long treated rescission and replacement as the same as 
modification.113  Nor is her premise accurate because repealing Medicaid would 
still be a contrived threat if it would not have occurred absent the prospect of 
inducing States to agree to the Expansion.114 
Finally, Ginsburg argued that the threat was constitutional because Congress and 
the States had already agreed that Congress could amend Medicaid and the 
Expansion was a foreseeable use of that power.115  This argument is quite different 
because it claims that coercion does not matter because voluntary State consent to 
                                           
108 See infra at _. 
109 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg opinion). 
110 Id. at 2605 (Roberts opinion). 
111 Id. 
112 Id.at 2629, 2636 (Ginsburg opinion). 
113 Restatement §89 Comment b. 
114 After all, “a threat need not be verbally expressed; it may be perfectly clear from actions performed what the 
threat is.”  Nozick, supra note , at 444. 
115 132 S. Ct. at 2630, 2638-39 (Ginsburg opinion). 
39 
the Expansion was unnecessary given that States had already agreed to it in their 
earlier Medicaid contracts.  This claim raises a different contract issue: when a 
contract gives one side unilateral power to amend a contract, what are the limits on 
how that power can be exercised without the other side’s consent?  Roberts’ 
opinion that such a unilateral power can be exercised to make only minor 
modifications is consistent with how contract law treats such provisions because 
without that implied limit the initial contract would contain illusory promises and 
be too indefinite to enforce.116  This explains why past minor Medicaid 
modifications were permissible even when unilaterally imposed by Congress. 
4. The Pending Obamacare Tax Credit Case.  In King v. Burwell,117 the 
challengers argue that Obamacare should be interpreted to deny federal tax credits 
to States that do not create their own health insurance exchanges.  My own view is 
that this interpretation conflicts with most of the relevant text, as well as with the 
statutory structure, the statutory purpose, and the canon that conditions on federal 
grants to States must be unambiguous.118  But the challengers’ interpretation 
should also be rejected because it interprets the statute as threatening to withhold 
those tax credits in order to coerce States to create insurance exchanges.  This 
threat is clearly contrived because (if making this threat were impossible) the 
enacting Congress surely would have preferred giving tax credits without this 
condition over denying taxing credits.  After all, as NFIB emphasized, Congress’ 
overriding goal was universal insurance coverage.119  Obamacare imposes 
community rating and guaranteed issue on all States that would drive healthier 
persons out of individual insurance markets unless coupled with tax credits and 
mandates that keep them in.120  Because Obamacare conditions mandates to buy 
insurance on the federal tax credit received, withholding tax credits would also lift 
the mandates for all employers and for 83% of individuals in States that refused to 
create exchanges.121  Withholding federal tax credits would thus cause a collapse of 
State insurance markets that is precisely opposite to the Congressional goal of 
universal coverage.  Indeed, it would trigger a collapse of individual insurance 
markets below pre-Obamacare levels that would also be contrary to the aims of 
even Congressional opponents to Obamacare. 
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The challengers’ interpretation would also meet the no-reasonable-choice element 
because carrying out the posited threat would leave States significantly worse off.  
The direct financial harm would alone be 6% of the average state budget,122 12 
times the 0.5% in Dole and closer to the 10% that NFIB found way past the 
constitutional line.123  Moreover, this financial harm would be multiplied because 
the threatened action would also cause individual insurance markets to collapse in 
the States that refused to establish their own exchanges.  Not only would this be 
harmful to their citizens and state economies (and thus to state tax revenue), but to 
deal with all the newly uninsured these States “would almost certainly find it 
necessary to increase its own health-care expenditures substantially” and indeed 
would be legally obligated to fund their emergency care in State hospitals.124  The 
total harm to States would surely exceed the 10% that NFIB held was obviously 
unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, the same principles that explain why the Court was correct to hold 
the Medicaid defunding threat unconstitutional show that interpreting Obamacare 
to threaten to withhold tax credits would also result in unconstitutionality.  One 
might try to argue that the two cases differ because in King the threat pressures 
States indirectly by withholding new tax credits from its citizens, but that was 
precisely the form of threat at issue in Steward, which held that the applicable legal 
standard to judge such threats was the same legal standard that NFIB applied to the 
Medicaid defunding threat.125  A holding that threats to deny new benefits cannot 
be coercive would also conflict with unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which 
often condemns withholding new benefits unless individuals waive their 
constitutional rights, and with underlying contractual principles, which often 
condemn threats to withhold new benefits to induce new contracts.126  In any event, 
the threat in King does not merely withhold new benefits: given the associated 
regulation, it threatens a collapse of individual insurance markets below pre-
Obamacare levels.   
Interpreting Obamacare as threatening to withhold tax credits must thus be rejected 
under the canon requiring that statutes be interpreted to avoid constitutional 
invalidity.  Indeed, as Justice Kennedy correctly stated at oral argument, the 
modern canon of constitutional avoidance requires avoiding that interpretation as 
long as it raises significant constitutional doubt or complexities, which would 
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certainly be the case.127  Further, even if one (in my view, incorrectly) concluded 
that the statute threatened to withhold tax credits so clearly that the canon of 
avoidance was inapplicable, that threat must be invalidated as unconstitutional.  
Some have argued that the remedy for such unconstitutionality is unclear, but the 
routine remedy for unconstitutional conditions has always been voiding the 
condition, not denying the government benefit to everyone.128  The contrived threat 
test explains why: such conditions are unconstitutional only when the threat was 
contrived, which by definition means that (if unable to impose the condition) the 
enacting legislature would have preferred granting the benefit over withholding it.  
This same legislative preference ranking means that statutory default rules on 
severability, which require severing the statute in a way that most likely to advance 
the enacting legislature’s preferences, require voiding the threat to withhold 
benefits rather than voiding the grant of benefits for everyone.129 
B. Unconstitutional Conditions Affecting Private Persons 
1. A General Proof.  Unconstitutional conditions cases involve situations where 
the government has the power to deny a benefit and persons have a constitutional 
autonomy right not to engage in certain conduct, and the government conditions 
the benefit on the person not exercising that right.  Sometimes courts declare such 
conditions unconstitutional, sometimes not.  The essential critique is there is no 
coherent theory for explaining when courts should declare such conditions 
unconstitutional.  But the following proves that the contrived-threat test does 
provide a coherent theory of which conditions violate the constitutional right not to 
engage in that conduct. 
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All persons necessarily prefer unconditioned benefits over both conditioned 
benefits and no benefits.  Persons who take conditioned benefits must also prefer 
them to no benefits, and thus for them unconditioned benefits > conditioned 
benefits > no benefits.  Persons who reject conditioned benefits must find them 
worse than no benefits, and thus for them unconditioned benefits > no benefits > 
conditioned benefits. 
The government threatens no benefits unless persons accept the conditioned 
benefits.  There are two possibilities depending on whether, if conditioned benefits 
could not be offered, the government would prefer to provide the benefits or not. 
a. Uncontrived Warning.  If the government prefers conditioned benefits > no 
benefits > unconditioned benefits, then threats to provide no benefits are 
uncontrived warnings because if constitutional law does not allow the conditioned 
benefits, then the government will provide no benefits.  Uncontrived warnings that 
benefits will be denied to those who reject the condition thus impose no penalty 
relative to the but-for world; they instead add a conditioned benefits option that 
some persons prefer to the but-for option of no benefit.  To be sure, persons would 
be even happier with unconditioned benefits, but that is not what they will get if 
conditioned benefits are unconstitutional.  Prohibiting conditioned benefits would 
be bad for both the government and persons who would accept the condition 
because they both must prefer conditioned benefits to no benefits.  Prohibiting 
conditioned benefits would not affect persons who would reject the condition 
because they would get no benefits either way.  Allowing conditioned benefits 
would thus make the government and some persons better off without making any 
persons worse off. 
b. Contrived Threat.  If the government instead prefers conditioned benefits > 
unconditioned benefits > no benefits, then threats to deny benefits to persons who 
do not accept conditioned benefits are contrived because if constitutional law does 
not allow the conditioned benefits, then the government would provide 
unconditioned benefits.  Such contrived threats penalize decisions to reject the 
condition by denying unconditioned benefits that would have been given in the 
but-for world.  Making a contrived threat thus has precisely the same effect as 
imposing a fine on those who exercise the constitutional right contrary to how the 
government wishes. 
For persons who reject the condition, the contrived threat means they will get no 
benefits, rather than the unconditioned benefits they would have received without 
the threat.  This effect makes these persons and the government worse off because 
they both prefer unconditioned benefits to no benefits. 
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For persons who accept the condition, the contrived threat means they will get 
conditioned benefits rather than unconditioned benefits.  This makes these persons 
worse off because they prefer unconditioned benefits.  But it makes the 
government better off because it prefers conditioned benefits to the unconditioned 
benefits it otherwise would have given.  The benefits are the same either way.  The 
only difference is that with the threat the constitutional right is exercised how the 
government wishes, whereas without the threat the constitutional right would be 
exercised how the person wishes.  But the existence of the constitutional autonomy 
right by definition means that the Constitution has normatively concluded that the 
right should be exercised how the person prefers, unless the person receives 
benefits they are willing to exchange for those rights.  Adding a contrived threat 
converts the situation so that, without any difference in benefit received, the right 
is now exercised how the government prefers instead.  The government has 
basically taken over the autonomy right without providing any offsetting benefit.  
The effect is identical to the effect that imposing a fine has on those persons who 
comply and thus do not pay the fine.  Given the premise of the constitutional right, 
the harm to these persons by definition exceeds the gain to the government. 
In other words, contrived threats force persons who accept the condition to give up 
their constitutional right in exchange for nothing because they get the same benefit 
they would have gotten in the but-for world if conditioned benefits were not 
possible.  That necessarily violates the posited constitutional right.  Indeed, the 
contrived threat harms all persons whether or not they accept the condition.  
Because the government conditioned the benefits, it must find the policy gain from 
individuals who accept the condition greater than the policy harm on individuals 
who reject the condition, but that policy gain is unconstitutional by premise and 
thus illegitimate. 
The above argument depends on the existence of a constitutional autonomy right, 
like the State right not to administer federal programs that was at issue in NFIB or 
the individual constitutional rights at issue in unconstitutional conditions caselaw.  
The same analysis would not apply if there is no constitutional autonomy right, but 
rather only a claim that the federal government is exceeding its Commerce Clause 
power.  For example, suppose Congress attaches to federal spending or tax 
exemptions a contrived threat to deny that benefit to individuals that do X, that 
individuals have no constitutional right not to be compelled to do X, but that 
compelling X lies beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  In that case, the 
contrived nature of the threat means it is coercive − i.e., regulatory – but there is no 
constitutional autonomy right to be free of such regulation.  In these cases, the 
question is instead whether regulatory uses of the federal spending and tax powers 
should be limited to the scope of the Commerce Clause power.  In a system of 
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multiple overlapping enumerated powers, it is not at all clear why it should be.  
Indeed, NFIB itself held the contrary, sustaining a regulatory use of the taxing 
power to penalize the nonpurchase of health insurance even though it struck down 
a mandate to buy health insurance as beyond the Commerce Clause.130  Consistent 
with this limitation, courts have not struck down even contrived threats to deny 
benefits when the affected conduct is not protected by any constitutional autonomy 
right but simply lies beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause power. 
c. Conclusion.  Accordingly, conditioning benefits on the waiver of constitutional 
rights violates those rights whenever the threat to deny benefits is contrived.  Such 
conditions do not violate those rights whenever the threat to deny benefits is 
uncontrived.  Conditioning benefits reflects a contrived threat only when, if unable 
to make such threat, the government would still provide the benefits. 
To put it another way, the contrived-threat test asks: in a but-for world where the 
condition could not be adopted, what would the government have done?  If the 
government would have offered the benefit in the but-for world, then denying the 
benefit imposes a penalty relative to that but-for world, and thus the condition 
unconstitutionally penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right.  If the 
government would not have offered the benefit in the but-for world, then denying 
the benefit imposes no such penalty and thus does not violate the recipient’s 
constitutional right. 
This analysis shows the error in the general claim that the greater power includes 
the lesser.  When threats are contrived, the greater power to withhold benefits 
entirely would not be exercised if the supposedly lesser power to condition benefits 
did not exist.  In such cases, the power to condition benefits is not lesser at all 
because it enables the government to achieve effects it would not achieve with the 
supposedly greater power. 
Nothing in the above proof requires relying on a contract analogy or on whether 
benefits were provided in the past.  Indeed, as we shall see, unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine fully applies to contrived threats to deny new benefits.  The 
relevant baseline entitlements are set by the Constitution, not by the past provision 
of benefits.  However, one could properly deem those constitutional rights to be 
part of the initial contract between the Government and its States and citizens.  
Further, regardless of whether one characterizes the initial set of constitutional 
entitlements as contractual, courts rely on contract principles to explain why that 
initial set of constitutional entitlements can ever be waived (i.e., modified) in 
exchange for government benefits.  It thus makes sense to conclude that the same 
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contract principles that allow some such modifications also limit others, so that the 
limits on contrived threats that induce agreements to modify initial contractual 
rights also apply to contrived threats that induce agreements to modify initial 
constitutional rights.  Accordingly, while not required for the proof, the contract 
analogy provides legal grounds for the same conclusions as that proof. 
To illustrate the above points, consider the classic case of Frost & Frost Trucking 
Co. v. Railroad Comm’n.131  California could legally ban truckers from its 
highways but truckers had (at the time) a substantive due process right not to be 
ordered to be common carriers.  The Supreme Court held it was unconstitutional 
for a California statute to condition highway access on truckers agreeing to be 
common carriers.  This holding has been critiqued because the truckers preferred 
being common carriers to lacking highway access.132  But this critique wrongly 
assumes that, if unable to condition the benefit, California would deny highway 
access to truckers.  That seems implausible because trucking is highly valuable to 
the state economy.  California’s preference ranking was surely instead Common 
Carrier Condition > Unconditioned Trucker Access > No Trucker Access.  
Therefore, if California could not impose the common carrier condition, California 
would instead give truckers highway access without that condition.  The threat to 
deny truckers access was thus a contrived threat that harmed truckers because they 
preferred unconditioned access to conditioned access.  The Court thus correctly 
held the statute unconstitutional.133 
The threat in Frost was also entirely credible because the statute committed to 
carry out the threat and enough truckers complied that legislators had no incentive 
to repeal the statute.  This is generally the case with unconstitutional conditions, 
and illustrates why contrived threats can be highly credible and why immunizing 
credible threats would produce the wrong result. 
d. Avoiding Analytical Confusion.  An important analytical benefit of the above 
analysis is that it carefully separates the issue of whether withholding benefits 
coercively violates a constitutional autonomy right not to engage in certain conduct 
from claims that (1) the threatened withholding is illegal, (2) the induced 
agreement is independently illegal even if uncoerced, or (3) the induced agreement 
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is legal even if coerced because there is no relevant constitutional right to be free 
of government coercion.  Past works have found unconstitutional conditions 
intractable in part because they often mixed up these analytically separate issues. 
For example, suppose the government provides a $100 prize to the person who 
writes the best essay arguing that the next President should be Hillary Clinton.  The 
threat to withhold $100 seems uncontrived because the government would not 
provide the $100 if it could not attach the condition.  Such a prize certainly would 
(and should) be unconstitutional.  Does that mean the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine does properly condemn uncontrived threats?   No, because the reason this 
prize is unconstitutional is not that it coerces the prize recipient into giving up her 
constitutional right to free speech.  Instead, it is because, even without coercion, 
such agreements violate equal protection because they fund speech favoring one 
political party over another, and thus harm third parties even if they benefit the 
agreeing parties.  To test this, suppose the government instead equally funds 
political speech for both parties, as it has done with Presidential campaigns.  Then 
there is no constitutional violation because the funding is equal.  For other 
examples, whether an uncoerced agreement is independently unconstitutional may 
be more difficult, but analytical clarity comes from seeing that such conclusions 
must rest on grounds other than coercion.  Just as some private contracts are illegal 
as a matter of public policy even if not produced by duress, likewise some 
government-person agreements are independently unconstitutional even if not 
produced by coercion.  Analytical clarity requires separating the issues. 
e. Difficulties of Proof.  One might be concerned that it is hard to determine 
whether a threat is contrived.  However, often, as in Frost and the Obamacare 
cases, it is not that hard, and this has not proven an insuperable problem for 
contract law, which has to resolve the same issue.  Even when it is hard, a difficult 
empirical question beats a vacuous standard.  Difficulties of proof are also a 
common issue in law.  The possibility of adjudicative error creates overdeterrence 
and underdeterrence, and we have our usual legal tools for dealing with it.  Here, 
because determining whether a threat is contrived will produce litigation costs and 
adjudicative error that deters uncontrived warnings to some extent, it makes sense 
to limit this doctrine (like the contract doctrine) to cases where underdeterrence 
concerns are significant by also requiring evidence that the carrying out the threat 
would have left the victim significantly worse off. 
No matter how difficult it may be for courts to figure out the true facts, we cannot 
avoid the reality is that some threats are actually contrived and some threats are 
actually uncontrived, and that the above proof shows the effects for agreeing 
persons are always harmful for the contrived threats and beneficial for the 
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uncontrived threats.  This is important because it means that any legal test one uses 
must be judged by the extent to which it does successfully deter contrived threats 
while avoiding deterring uncontrived warnings.  As we shall see below, the legal 
tests used by the Supreme Court do fairly well on this score. 
2. The Fit With Caselaw.  Supreme Court standards on unconstitutional conditions 
correlate, albeit imperfectly, with a contrived-threat test.  The application of those 
standards can be improved by clarifying that in ambiguous cases they should be 
interpreted to implement a contrived-threat test. 
a. Threats to Deny Funds Used for Government-Desired Objectives to Those 
Who Exercise Constitutional Rights Without Using Government Funds.  A series 
of cases draws the following distinction.  Congress can deny funds to persons that 
use federal funds for activities Congress does not want to subsidize.  But Congress 
cannot deny funds to persons that use federal funds only for “activities Congress 
wants to subsidize” based on how those persons exercise constitutional rights that 
are not federally funded.134  Although the Court itself admits this “line is hardly 
clear” or “self-evident,”135 a contrived-threat test helps define the line. 
Denying funds used for activities Congress does not want to subsidize is an 
uncontrived warning because, if unable to impose that condition, Congress would 
not provide the funds given that by definition it does not want to subsidize the 
activity.  Allowing this condition will thus make the persons that want to accept it 
better off without harming anyone. 
Denying funds used for activities Congress does want to subsidize is likely a 
contrived threat because, if unable to impose the condition, Congress would likely 
provide the funds because the funds are by definition being used for activities 
Congress wants to subsidize.  The Court thus correctly prohibits such threats, 
rejecting the contrary view that such threats are constitutional whenever the 
condition advances Congressional objectives.136  The problem with this contrary 
view is that all it means is that Congress prefers Conditioned Funds > Funding 
Activities Congress Wants > No Funding.  Thus, if unable to use the challenged 
condition, Congress would still fund the activities it wants.  Accordingly, its threat 
to instead cut off all funding is a contrived threat that should be prohibited. 
This precedent further holds that, if the activities Congress wants to subsidize can 
be separated from the exercise of constitutional rights without those federal funds, 
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then Congress must allow such separation.137  Thus, Congress may not, by 
commingling funds, use an uncontrived warning to provide funds only for 
activities it wants as an excuse for a contrived threat to withhold those funds 
because persons engaged in protected unfunded activities.  That is, when separated 
funding is possible and legislatively preferable to denying all funding, the refusal 
to provide separated funding would be a contrived threat. 
Consider Harris v. McRae,138 which held that Congress could not threaten to 
withhold non-abortion Medicaid funding from women who had abortions using 
nonfederal funds.  Critics have argued that this conclusion offers no sound theory 
of whether the benefit of getting non-abortion Medicaid should be included in the 
transaction.139  But that critique assumes non-abortion Medicaid would have been 
withheld in the but-for world without the condition.  In fact, the Court was right 
that in that but-for world, Congress would (and demonstrably does) prefer funding 
non-abortion Medicaid to eliminating Medicaid.  A threat to deny all Medicaid 
funding would thus be contrived.  Accordingly, no “benefit” of non-abortion 
Medicaid would be caused by the posited condition.  Rather, such a condition 
would coercively threaten to take a benefit that would exist without any condition. 
b. Penalties v. Subsidies.  The Supreme Court has held that conditioning 
government benefits on persons giving up their constitutional right to travel, speak, 
or observe their Sabbath is an unconstitutional penalty,140 but that conditioning 
benefits on persons giving up their right to strike or avoid mandatory home visits is 
a constitutional subsidy.141  Critics have argued that these two lines of cases are 
inconsistent.142  But whether they are consistent depends on empirical predictions 
of what the government would likely do if unable to adopt these conditions.   
In the former line of cases, it is clear that, if left with a choice between providing 
the benefits without the challenged condition and not providing the benefits at all, 
the government would choose to provide the benefits.  Indeed, that is what has 
happened.  The threats to deny those benefits were thus contrived threats to impose 
penalties relative to the but-for world. 
The validity of the latter line of cases turns on whether one thinks that, if unable to 
adopt the challenged conditions, the government would have preferred to withhold 
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the benefits rather than provide them without those conditions.  The Court found 
that Congress adopted the no-strike condition because it wanted to make sure food 
stamps were not used to fund strikes, and that New York adopted the home-visit 
condition because it wanted to make sure welfare benefits were being used to 
advance the best interests of children.143  If the desire to avoid such unwanted uses 
of federal funds were strong enough, then (if the conditions were unavailable) 
Congress might well prefer withholding these benefits to providing benefits 
without conditions that would prevent unwanted uses.  If so, then the threats to 
deny those benefits were uncontrived warnings, and the Court was right that they 
did not impose penalties.  The Court’s implicit empirical predictions are not self-
evidently wrong, and if they are correct the two lines of cases are normatively 
consistent.  But courts should clarify the penalty/subsidy distinction by explicitly 
interpreting those terms to be measured relative to what the government would 
have done without the challenged condition. 
c. Nexus or Germaneness.  Another line of cases concerns situations where the 
government can deny a development permit outright, but cannot directly take some 
of the owner’s property rights without just compensation.  The government 
threatens to deny the permit unless the owner agrees to a condition that exacts 
some of its property rights, such as giving an easement to the public.  The Supreme 
Court has held that such threats are constitutional only if the condition’s purpose 
has an “essential nexus” to whatever purpose would be served by withholding the 
permit.144  More generally, the pattern of Court results on unconstitutional 
conditions indicates it is more willing to uphold a condition that is “germane” to 
any government reasons for withholding the benefit.145   
If a nexus or germaneness exists between the condition and withholding the 
benefit, then a government that cannot use the condition is more likely to advance 
the same purpose by withholding the benefit.  Offering an unconditioned benefit is 
less likely in the no-condition world because that does not serve the same purpose.  
Accordingly, nexus or germaneness indicates that threats to withhold benefits are 
likely uncontrived warnings that should make the condition constitutional. 
If no nexus or germaneness exists between the condition and withholding the 
benefit, then inability to use the condition is less likely to cause the government to 
withhold the benefit because the two serve different purposes.  Offering an 
unconditioned benefit is more likely in the no-condition world because giving the 
benefit does serve the same purpose as the benefit that would be given in a 
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conditioned benefit.  (For example, providing a conditioned permit and an 
unconditioned permit both provide whatever policy gains flow from real estate 
development.)  Thus, a lack of nexus or germaneness indicates that threats to 
withhold benefits are likely contrived threats that should make the condition 
unconstitutional.146 
However, even if the condition and denying a permit further very different 
purposes, the government may value those different purposes equally, in which 
case different purposes need not suggest a contrived threat.  For example, Nollan 
found no nexus between the purpose of the condition (providing public access to 
the beach) and the purpose of denying the permit (protecting visual access to the 
ocean).147  Although those purposes are different, the government might value 
them the same and thus value denying the permit similarly to a conditioned permit.  
If so, then holding such conditioned permits unconstitutional will prevent 
uncontrived warnings and result in the permits being denied outright.  This is by 
definition worse for the property owner and the government, because both prefer 
the conditioned permit to no permit.  We can thus improve doctrine by interpreting 
nexus and germaneness to mean a similar government valuation of the condition 
and denial that is likely to make the threat uncontrived. 
d. Plea Bargaining.  In a plea bargaining agreement, a prosecutor threatens to 
bring criminal charges unless the defendant agrees to a certain sentence.  The 
prosecutor thus offers a benefit (non-prosecution) in exchange for the defendant 
waiving constitutional rights.  Some argue that plea bargains are coerced by the 
threat of imprisonment.148  But plea bargains are usually enforced.  The reason is 
that although the threat of prosecution may leave the defendant with no reasonable 
alternative to agreeing to the plea bargain, duress only exists if the threat is also 
improper, which the threat of prosecution ordinarily is not. 
How can we determine which threats of prosecution are improper?  By 
determining whether or not the threat is contrived.  If the prosecutor is threatening 
to bring the same charges she would have brought if no plea bargain were possible, 
then she is simply offering an uncontrived warning.  This does not penalize the 
criminal for exercising his constitutional rights because he would have faced the 
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same charges even in the no-threat world.  In this case, offering a plea bargain can 
only make the defendant better off, by giving him the option of agreeing to a 
sentence he finds less harmful than the expected harm from prosecution in the no-
threat world. 
In contrast, suppose the prosecutor is overcharging: threatening to bring charges 
she would not have brought in the no-threat world in order to coerce a plea 
bargain.  Then the prosecutor is making a contrived threat that does penalize the 
defendant for exercising his constitutional rights because he would not have faced 
the same charges in the no-threat world.  Accordingly, plea bargains produced by 
such contrived threats should be unenforceable. 
Usually, it is difficult to determine whether prosecutors have overcharged to 
induce plea bargains because there is no observable non-plea-bargain baseline.  
However, sometimes there is relevant evidence on this.  For example, suppose a 
prosecutor initially brought certain charges but then, after the defendant refused to 
plead guilty, added more charges.  The Supreme Court has indicated that such a 
clearly contrived threat likely violates due process.149  But when prosecutors 
indicate their intention to bring certain charges before the plea negotiations begin, 
the Court found insufficient evidence to show a contrived threat that violated due 
process.150  Still, if concrete evidence did exist that the prosecutor’s initial charges 
were deliberately excessive to coerce plea bargains, that should suffice to show a 
due process violation. 
3. Comparing Other Proposed Tests.  Illustrious scholars have advocated many 
other tests for dealing with unconstitutional conditions.  However, their tests all 
either underinclusively allow some contrived threats or overinclusively condemn 
some uncontrived warnings.  Where their tests produce results that overlap the 
conclusions of a contrived-threat test, my analysis contributes a consequentialist 
proof in favor of those conclusions that has heretofore been lacking. 
Kathleen Sullivan argues that courts should focus on the distributive effect of 
conditioned benefits.151  Such distributive effects may well show that the selective 
denial or grant of benefits violates equal protection or the constitutional rights of 
third parties.  But if so, then either the threatened denial of benefits or agreements 
granting benefits are themselves unconstitutional regardless of any coercion.  Cass 
Sunstein makes a similar argument, but recognizes that it amounts to abandoning 
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the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions doctrine.152  Their analysis thus cannot 
explain the puzzle of why conditions are sometimes held unconstitutionally 
coercive even when the threatened denial of benefits and agreement to grant 
benefits are both lawful.  Further, when both are lawful, their tests would 
immunize all conditioned benefits, which would incorrectly allow contrived threats 
that penalize the exercise of constitutional rights 
Philip Hamburger argues that all conditioned benefits should be unconstitutional 
whenever the condition waives a constitutional right.153  His test cannot explain the 
puzzle of why courts often hold precisely the opposite.  His test would also 
incorrectly condemn all uncontrived warnings, which would harm both the 
government and the persons with the constitutional rights in question. 
Richard Epstein argues that current constitutional law deviates from ideal 
constitutional law by weakly protecting contract and property rights and allowing 
government redistribution of wealth.  To move us closer to his ideal, he argues that 
conditioning benefits should be: (a) unconstitutional when his ideal constitution 
would not allow denial of the benefit (like preventing businesses from operating); 
but (b) constitutional when his ideal constitution would not allow providing the 
benefit (like providing food stamps).154  One obvious problem is that one might 
disagree with his ideal constitution.  But the problem is deeper: his approach would 
actually move us further from his own ideal.  When the threat is to deny one of his 
ideally-required benefits, he and I would both condemn contrived threats but he 
would also condemn uncontrived warnings, thus resulting in precisely the denials 
that he fears, as well as preventing a government-person bargain that would make 
them both better off.  When the threat is to deny one of his ideally-prohibited 
benefits, he and I would both allow uncontrived warnings but he would also allow 
contrived threats, thus allowing the government to use their ideally-prohibited 
power to penalize the exercise of constitutional rights that Epstein himself deems 
ideal. 
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Mitchel Berman argues that threatening to deny benefits should be presumptively 
unconstitutional if the purpose of carrying out the threat would be to make it more 
costly to exercise a constitutional choice.155  Unfortunately, purpose is a murky 
test, especially because different legislators have different purposes, and Berman 
stresses that his purpose test deviates from a pure predictive test like mine.156  Nor 
does he define the grounds for rebutting his presumption.  Wherever his test 
produces conclusions that deviate from a contrived-threat test, his test will either 
undesirably allow contrived threats or undesirably prohibit uncontrived warnings. 
Kenneth Simons would deviate from a predictive baseline when the government 
plausibly believes the condition is relevant to the legitimate purposes of the 
government program.157  But such deviations would undesirably allow contrived 
threats that penalize the exercise of constitutional rights whenever the condition 
has some relevance but that relevance is not important enough to mean the benefit 
would be denied without that condition.  As Simons acknowledges, his conclusion 
conflicts with caselaw prohibiting the government from conditioning benefits on 
working the Sabbath.158  His argues that without his related-purpose exception, the 
government could not limit political campaigning by public employees.159  But 
while such limits do seem permissible, the reason is not that they are uncoercive 
but because the constitutional interest of undistorted politics justifies compelling 
public employees not to campaign, making coercion irrelevant. 
Seth Kreimer proposes a mix of historical, equality, and predictive baselines to 
judge whether threats to withhold benefits are unconstitutionally coercive.160  
However, whenever his historical or equality baselines allow conditions that a 
predictive baseline would condemn, his test wrongly allows contrived threats that 
penalize the exercise of constitutional rights.  Whenever his historical or normative 
baselines condemn conditions that a predictive baseline would allow, his test 
wrongly condemns uncontrived warnings that would benefit both the government 
and persons with the constitutional right. 
True, Kreimer’s historical baseline is relevant to the right test because the past 
government conferral of unconditioned benefits helps suggest it would have likely 
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continued to do if it could not add the condition.  However, government policy 
does change over time, and the historical baseline should be rejected whenever 
there is evidence that it does not accurately predict what the government would 
have done without the condition.  Kremier argues otherwise because persons rely 
on prior benefits.161  But when the historical test deviates from the predictive test, it 
will be either when it (1) allows undesirable contrived threats to withhold a new 
benefit, for which reliance is irrelevant, or (2) condemns desirable uncontrived 
warnings about the coming denial of old benefits, in which case his test would 
produce a denial of old benefits that affirmatively harms reliance interests. 
Likewise, Kreimer’s equality baseline is relevant to the right test because 
government conferral of a benefit on all the persons who accept the condition may 
suggest a purpose for doing so that would likely extend to everyone if it could not 
adopt the condition.  However, to accurately judge whether the condition 
unlawfully coerces the threat recipient, this equity baseline should be rejected 
when it deviates from the predictive baseline.  After all, when there is such a 
deviation, the equity baseline will either (1) allow contrived threats to withhold 
benefits that others do not get, which penalizes the constitutional autonomy right, 
or (2) condemn uncontrived warnings about the coming denial of benefits that 
others do get, in which case his test would produce a denial of benefits that harms 
everyone. 
 
IV. THREATS THAT INDUCE NEW PRIVATE CONTRACTS 
A contract is obviously unenforceable if the terms are independently illegal or if 
induced by threatening illegal conduct.  But threats of otherwise lawful action to 
induce an otherwise lawful new contract can also constitute duress when the threat 
is improper and the victim has no reasonable choice.162  Such threats are deemed 
“improper” only when they are contrived. 
A. Threats to Exercise Unrelated Rights 
Even if a party has every legal right to terminate a contract, a threat to do so “for 
some purpose unrelated to the contract, such as to induce the recipient to make an 
entirely separate contract, is ordinarily improper.”163  Such facts indicate the 
threatener had no reason not to continue performing the first contract, and thus 
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would have performed it if unable to communicate a threat designed to induce the 
separate contract.  Such a threat is thus contrived. 
The same can be true when a party threatens not to enter one contract to induce 
another.  In one case, a lessor said it would rent to the purchaser of a leaving 
tenant’s business, but then threatened not to do so unless the leaving tenant forked 
over 45% of his business sale proceeds.  This threat was held improper and thus 
invalidated the new contract to pay 45% of the business sales proceeds.164  This fits 
the contrived-threat test because the lessor had clearly indicated it was happy to 
rent to the new tenant and threatened otherwise only to extort part of the business 
sale proceeds. 
In short, when a party threatens to exercise unrelated rights to induce a new 
contract, such threats are improper when the threat is contrived; that is, when the 
party would not exercise the unrelated rights in that way but for the ability to 
communicate the threat.  Such contrived threats impose penalties the victim would 
not have incurred in the no-threat world.  Because the threat of such penalties can 
induce the victim to agree to terms on the new contract that are not in its interest, 
they eliminate the normal assurance that the new contract allocates resources to the 
highest-value user.  Thus, such contracts are properly held unenforceable. 
If, instead, the threat were to exercise unrelated rights in a way that would be in the 
interests of the threatener even if no new contract could be induced, then the threat 
would be an uncontrived warning.  Because the unrelated rights would be 
exercised in an adverse way in the no-threat world, the new contract must make the 
threat recipient better off because he prefers the new contract terms to having the 
unrelated rights exercised adversely.  Thus, in such cases, the new contracts are 
properly held enforceable. 
B. Threats Not to Enter Into the Challenged New Contract 
1. Threats to Withhold Desired Goods Unless the Market Price Is Paid.  The 
typical threat that induces a new contract is a threat to withhold goods unless the 
market price is paid.  Some argue that all such threats are coercive because 
individuals have no reasonable choice but to pay to get the goods they need to 
live.165  However, if the seller could not sell to the individual at the market price, 
then the seller would withhold the good because it would prefer to sell to someone 
else for the market price.  The threat to withhold the good is thus an uncontrived 
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warning.  If duress law made the contract unenforceable, this individual would thus 
not get the good that they need.  (Of course, if price regulations generally required 
a lower price, then some individuals would get the good, but recall our premise is 
that the terms of the contract are not independently illegal.)  This is true even if the 
seller is a monopolist because then the market price is the monopoly price, and the 
seller would prefer to sell to someone else at the monopoly price rather than sell to 
any particular individual at a sub-monopoly price.  Thus, refusals to sell for less 
than the market price are enforceable no matter how much the buyer needs the 
good.166 
Batsakis v. Demotsis167 shows that this point holds even in extreme cases.  In war-
torn Greece in 1942, Demotsis borrowed 500,000 drachmae (worth about $25) in 
exchange for a promise to later pay $2,000 after the war.  The court held this 
agreement was enforceable.  Because the war-torn circumstances doubtless made 
Demostis desperate for the money, critics have argued that her promise was 
extracted under duress.168  But those same war-torn circumstances also likely made 
having cash highly valuable and lending money highly risky, and no evidence was 
offered that the high rate charged differed from the going market price.  Thus, if 
Batsakis did not believe the contract would be enforceable, he likely would not 
have lent the money to Demostis, which would have made her even worse off 
given her apparent desperate need for money.  Because the threat to withhold the 
money unless promised $2000 was thus an uncontrived warning, the contract was 
properly held enforceable.  Moreover, assuming the high market rate reflected the 
desperate need of persons in war-torn Greece for cash, we want such high rates to 
be enforceable in order to encourage others to increase the supply of cash to war-
torn Greece to meet that need. 
2. Threats to Withhold Desired Goods When Parties Have Been Cut Off From 
the Market.  Sometimes parties might be cut off from the market, so that it does 
not provide an effective constraint.  If the buyer has been cut off, a seller might 
threaten not to sell a product unless it receives an above-market price.  If the seller 
has been cut off, the buyer might threaten not to buy unless it receives a below-
market price.  When should such threats be deemed contrived? 
Consider first cases where a seller has taken steps to cut the buyer off from the 
market in order to try and charge the buyer an above-market price.  Then a threat 
not to sell at less than an above-market price is clearly contrived because if that 
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threat could not be made, then the seller would be willing to sell to the buyer at the 
market price and would not have taken steps to cut off the buyer to begin with.  For 
example, if a seller misleads a buyer into thinking he will supply a good at the 
market price and thus causes the buyer to forego other options until it is too late, 
then a threat not to sell unless an above-market price is paid is contrived and a 
contract at that above-market price is unenforceable.169 
Now suppose a seller, through no productive effort, stumbles upon a buyer who 
has been cut off from the market for adventitious reasons.  For example, suppose 
Bill Gates shows up at the emergency room needing immediate lifesaving 
treatment, and the doctor says she will not treat him unless he promises to pay her 
$1 billion.  Then the doctor’s threat is contrived because if that threat were not 
possible, the doctor would be willing to treat Bill Gates at the doctor’s usual 
market rate.  Thus, Bill Gate’s agreement to pay $1 billion is unenforceable.170 
If, in the adventitious case, there is no clear market rate, an alternative price 
baseline might still show that the seller made a contrived threat.  This point is 
illustrated by Post v Jones.171  In the 1849, three whaling ships happened to find 
another whaling ship stranded on rocks in the Artic right before winter and agreed 
to buy the stranded ship’s whale oil for a very low price.  Although the whale oil 
was nominally “auctioned,” the stranded ship had more oil than the three ships 
could take, so they had no need to compete with each other on price.172  The 
Supreme Court recognized that even when salvage is an “absolute necessity,” 
parties can set salvage prices by contract when the stranded ship has access to “a 
market and competition.”173  However, the Court held that this contract was 
unenforceable for two reasons.  First, the stranded ship had no reasonable choice 
but to take whatever the three ships offered because “there was no market [and] no 
competition.”174  Second, taking the whale oil at the default price (which is set by 
salvage law when no binding contract exists) was still highly profitable because 
salvaging the oil required little risk or effort and the opportunity costs of filling the 
cargo space were low given that the whaling season was ending.175   
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The second finding in Post v. Jones meant that the three ships’ threat not to take 
the oil at the default rate was a contrived threat because, if they could not make 
that threat, they would have happily salvaged the oil at the still highly-profitable 
default rate.  No salvaging was the wrong but-for baseline because salvaging 
would have occurred in the no-threat world.  Indeed, the Court explicitly rejected 
the three ships’ claim that the stranded ship was not harmed because it was better 
off than if no salvaging had been provided.176  The effects of allowing salvagers to 
price below the default salvage price in such accidental monopoly cases is harmful 
because if ships know that rescues will cost them almost all the value of their 
cargo, they will take excessive precautions to avoid the need for rescue.177  In 
contrast, because the default price was high enough to make salvage profitable and 
finding the stranded ship was adventitious, using it as the baseline for judging 
whether a threat is contrived will not reduce any salvage effort.  But this result 
depends critically on having some known desirable price baseline to determine that 
a contrived threat was made. 
Now suppose a situation where a seller earns being in a situation where the buyer 
is cut off from the market.  For example, suppose the rescue ships were actually in 
the business of searching the seas for stranded ships.  If the default price provided 
by salvage law suffices to compensate those search costs, then a threat to withhold 
salvage unless paid more than that default price would be contrived because absent 
an ability to make that threat, the rescue ship would have incurred the search costs 
and provided salvage.  If the default price provided by salvage law does not suffice 
to compensate for those search costs, then a threat to withhold salvage unless paid 
more than that default price would be an uncontrived warning because absent an 
ability to make that threat, the rescue ship would not have incurred the search costs 
and thus not been there to provide salvage.  This result could also be achieved by 
adjusting the default price to compensate for efficient search costs.178 
3.Bilateral Negotiation to Split Extra-Market Surplus.  Suppose neither party has 
been cut off from the market but the seller’s goods are worth more to the buyer 
than to any other buyer.  This is a frequent situation, often because of relationship-
specific investments.  An employee who works at a firm may develop firm-specific 
skills that make the employee more valuable to the firm than to any other firm.  Or 
a business that rents a location may find at renewal that the location is more 
valuable to it than any other location is.  In these cases, we have a bilateral 
negotiation over how to split an extra-market surplus because although the buyer 
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cannot find any other seller whose goods it values as much, the seller also cannot 
find any other buyer who values its goods as much.  There will be a bargaining 
range, with the minimum price the seller would take being the market price other 
buyers would pay, and the maximum price the buyer would pay being the higher 
value it puts on the good.  The results of such bargaining are indeterminate. 
In these cases of bilateral negotiations about the split of extra-market surplus, the 
contrived-threat test is not helpful because we have no baseline price to assess 
whether a contrived threat has been made.  One might think that a contract at any 
price above the seller’s reservation price must reflect a contrived threat because the 
seller would take the reservation price if it were unable to insist on a higher price.  
However, it is also the case that any price below the buyer’s reservation price must 
reflect a contrived threat by the buyer because the buyer would take its reservation 
price if it were unable to insist on a lower price.  Such negotiations thus cannot 
help but reflect contrived threats by both sides, and a contrived-threat test thus 
cannot give either side a unique right to void the contract.  Moreover, both sides 
would be worse off if contracts between them were unenforceable because any 
contract between them leaves them better off than a contract with others.  Thus, 
contracts produced by such bargaining are enforceable.179 
C. Blackmail 
In the case of blackmail, the threat is to divulge information to third parties unless 
the victim agrees to pay money.  Blackmail law had long been regarded as “one of 
the most elusive intellectual puzzles in all of law.”180  Contrived-threat analysis 
helps solve that puzzle by showing that all blackmail contracts are necessarily 
produced by either contrived threats or uncontrived warnings and that each has 
distinctive harmful effects.  Contrived blackmail threats are coercive and cause 
inefficiency between the contracting parties, without affecting the information 
revealed to third parties.  Uncontrived blackmail threats are noncoercive and 
benefit the contracting parties, but prevent information disclosures to third parties 
whose interests often trump the interests of the contracting parties.  To explain 
blackmail law, we need to understand the combination of these effects. 
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1. Contrived Blackmail Threats Are Always Coercive and Invalid.  Consider first 
cases when divulging the relevant information “would not significantly benefit the 
party making the threat.”181  Given that the act of revealing this information would 
not significantly benefit the threatener, it is likely a contrived threat.  True, if 
divulging information is very cheap, one might wonder whether the threatener 
would divulge the information in the no-threat world for even insignificant 
benefits.  But effort is necessary to collect information and (even when acquired 
fortuitously) to document the information in a way that can be divulged in a way 
that is sufficiently persuasive to be effective and overcome the risk of suits for libel 
or slander.  A blackmailer would not likely incur the costs of such effort for 
insignificant benefits without the prospect of making blackmail threats. 
Thus, any threat to divulge information is likely to be a contrived threat if 
divulging the information confers no significant benefit to the threatener.  
Allowing such contrived blackmail threats would harm the victim because in the 
no-threat world he would not pay money and the information would still not be 
divulged.  Because such contrived threats do not affect the revelation of 
information, preventing such blackmail would not affect third parties.  Finally, 
preventing such contrived blackmail threats would reduce blackmailer efforts that 
inefficiently incur costs to induce nothing but an unproductive transfer of wealth. 
Because these effects are always negative, contract law correctly condemns all 
blackmail contracts induced by such contrived threats, regardless of what sort of 
information is at issue. 
2. Uncontrived Blackmail Threats Benefit Contracting Parties But Harm Third 
Party Interests.  Consider now cases where divulging information would 
significantly benefit the threatener.  For example, suppose the information was 
collected by an investigative reporter who would, in the no-threat world, publish 
the information in an article.  In that case, the threat to divulge the information is 
clearly an uncontrived warning.182  Accordingly, an agreement to suppress the 
information is in the interests of both contracting parties because the victim prefers 
paying the money to having the information divulged and the blackmailer prefers 
getting the money to revealing the information.  But this blackmail contract does 
prevent a disclosure of information to third parties that otherwise would have 
occurred.  Whether to invalidate blackmail contracts induced by uncontrived 
                                           
181 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §176(2)(a) & Comment f (“Clause (a) is concerned with cases in which a 
party threatens to do an act that would not significantly benefit him but would harm the other party.... A typical 
example is a threat to make public embarrassing information concerning the recipient unless he makes a proposed 
contract.”) 
182 Some believe that the costs of collecting and revealing information are sometimes so trivial that it would occur 
even without any significant benefit.  To the extent they are right, such threats are also uncontrived warnings and 
have the effects described in this section. 
61 
warnings thus turns on whether third party interests in the information trump the 
interests of the contracting parties, which varies with the information at issue. 
In particular, when the information concerns crimes, the public obviously has a 
powerful interest in knowing the information because that helps deter crimes that 
harm the public.  Because the public interest in discovering crimes exceeds the 
interests of the contracting parties in concealing crimes, such blackmail contracts 
are invalid even when uncoercive.  Accordingly, contract law correctly condemns 
all blackmail about crimes, whether or not divulging the information would confer 
a significant benefit that makes the threat uncontrived.183  The reason is that all 
such blackmail about crimes necessarily involves either (1) a contrived threat that 
creates inefficiency for the contracting parties without affecting information 
disclosure or (2) an uncontrived warning that suppresses the disclosure of criminal 
information to third parties whose interests trump the interests of the contracting 
parties. 
When the information involves embarrassing noncriminal information, then third 
party interests are weaker and it is less clear whether they outweigh the interests of 
the contracting parties.  In the investigative reporter example, one might worry 
about the harm to the reporter’s newspaper or its readership from suppressing the 
information.  On the other hand, one might regard their interests in salacious 
information as weak.  Such judgments vary by jurisdiction and court and with the 
specific information at issue.  General contract law thus does not condemn 
agreements induced by threats to divulge embarrassing noncriminal information 
when divulging would significantly benefit the threatener (i.e., when it is an 
uncontrived warning),184 leaving it to other bodies of law to decide when such 
noncoercive contracts should be void on public policy grounds. 
Why, however, do some criminal blackmail statutes seem to overinclusively 
condemn even uncontrived warnings about information with little legitimate third 
party interest?  Perhaps partly because adjudicative errors in distinguishing 
between contrived and uncontrived blackmail threats would create strong 
underdeterrence concerns if such an exception were recognized.  Nor are blackmail 
statutes literally applied in certain cases.  Consider the fact that litigation usually 
ends in a settlement where someone gets money and agrees not to disclose 
information about the other party.  Because such confidentiality has value, 
something must have been paid for it in the settlement, so literally this exchange 
fits broad definitions of blackmail.  But no one treats it that way.  The analysis here 
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explains why.  Litigation already provides copious incentives to collect and 
document the information, so disclosure is costless.  Further, litigants generally 
dislike each other, so disclosure likely produces serious psychic benefits.  Thus, 
threats to divulge the information collected in litigation are particularly likely to be 
uncontrived.  Adjudicative errors and under-deterrence are thus less of a concern 
and an implicit exception is recognized.  The analysis here thus helps explain not 
only why blackmail prohibitions are so broad, but also why nonliteral exceptions 
are sometimes recognized. 
3. Prior Literature.  Prior works on blackmail have tended to find it perplexing 
because they either focus on the legality of the threatened act rather than on the 
practical effects of the threats,185 or because they focus on some of those practical 
effects to the exclusion of others.  Some articles focus on protecting the interests of 
third parties in information,186 but they cannot explain the universal ban on 
contrived blackmail threats, which do not affect third party information.  Other 
works focus on the harm to victims and the inefficiency of efforts to collect 
information with no productive gain,187 but they cannot explain the ban on many 
uncontrived blackmail warnings, where the victim benefits, the information would 
be collected anyway, and the blackmail contract does alter the information 
revealed to third parties.  Scott Altman has offered what he calls a “patchwork” 
theory that combines many of these effects.188  What contrived-threat analysis 
clarifies is the deeper structure that all blackmail must have one or the other of 
these sets of effects and that only the combination can explain the full scope and 
limits of blackmail law. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Contractual duress, unconstitutional conditions, and blackmail have been 
longstanding puzzles because the focus has been on the wrong baseline: what the 
threatener should do or legally could do.  One must instead focus on what the 
threatener would do absent the threat to resolve these puzzles.  Only contrived 
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threats to take action that differs from this but-for action can harm the recipient of 
the threat and be coercive.  Uncontrived warnings can only benefit the agreeing 
parties and thus should be unlawful only when even an uncoerced agreement 
would be unlawful, usually because the agreement harms third parties. 
